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ONE
INTRODUCTION
“New England was perfectly positioned for
trade. In cod it had a product that Europe and
European colonies wanted, and because of cod it
had a population with spending power that was
hungry for European products. This was what built
Boston… Adam Smith, the eighteenth-century
economist, singled out the New England fishery for
praise in his seminal work on capitalism, The
Wealth of Nations… By the eighteenth century, cod
had lifted New England from a distant colony of
starving settlers to an international commercial
power. Massachusetts had elevated cod from
commodity to fetish. The members of the ‘codfish
aristocracy,’ those who traced their family fortunes
to the seventeenth-century cod fisheries, had openly
worshiped the fish as the symbol of their wealth.”
(Kurlansky 1997: 74-79)
Like so many formerly abundant fisheries, New England’s once legendary cod
fishery was severely depleted by centuries of intensive fishing. To the shock of
the region these prolific fish helped build, cod populations collapsed nearly two
decades ago, with little hope of recovery.
In November of 2006, just days before the midterm elections, the
prestigious journal Science released a study concluding that all the commercial
fisheries in the world will have collapsed and the world will therefore run out of
seafood within our lifetimes (by 2048) if current trends continue (Stokstad 2006).
This dramatic and horrifying news received only small blurbs in most American
newspapers, and none of the politicians or pundits addressed this important news
in their flurry of campaigning. Even as the day’s leading environmental issue,
global warming, is becoming more prominent in the American consciousness,
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politicians and private citizens alike remain largely unaware of the current crisis
of the ocean. Despite lack of interest from the public and policy makers, the
depletion of the world’s fisheries is a serious problem, and will have very serious
environmental, social and economic consequences in the near future.
The ocean is so large that for most of human history we have thought of
its resources, especially fish, as limitless. It would have been unfathomable to our
ancestors that the ocean could be over fished. Yet, here we are, considering the
prospect of a world without seafood. Depletion of world fisheries is an especially
complicated issue because of its global nature: there is only one ocean, and it is
the planet’s largest public domain (Whitty 2006:34).
In many ways the situation of marine fisheries is quite similar to other
environmental problems; however, fish are rather unique as a resource. In
addition to being highly mobile, disobeying national boundaries, and being quite
difficult to regulate, fish are living creatures with complex biology and behaviors,
and are integral parts of a larger, little understood ecosystem, which includes the
humans who depend on them for their livelihoods, and often, their food supply. A
“fishery” therefore encompasses more than just the fish themselves, including
their environment and all the complex factors that influence their populations
(Sneddon 2007), including humans. For the purposes of this thesis, the term
fishery refers to fish, their ecosystem, and the people with whom their fate is
intertwined. This is why fisheries depletion cannot be considered in quite the
same way one might consider, say, natural gas extraction or water conflicts. As
Thomas MacMillan explains, “overfishing is a big problem for two reasons: the
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first is technical. Fish are a common resource because they are fugitive - in
simplest terms, they swim vast distances and so they are never under the control
of one resource manager. The second reason is social. Fish aren’t just part of the
environment, they are also a crucial source of food, employment and income”
(2003:3). The very nature of fish and fisheries then, makes overfishing an
especially challenging, and important, environmental problem to address.
The factors threatening fish populations vary some by region and species,
but almost all suffer from pollution, habitat loss, and overly intensive harvesting.
Not only have the sheer numbers of people and boats fishing the world’s oceans
increased in the last century, the way we fish has changed dramatically. We use
extremely advanced technology to enable us to fish every corner of the ocean,
finding fish in areas previously safe from our fleets. We combine this technology
with indiscriminate fishing methods like long lining and drift nets, which catch
and kill many unintended ocean creatures (young fish, those farther down the
food chain, mammals, endangered species), and trawling which decimates entire
ocean habitats. For years this meant that we were catching more and more fish.
However, despite all this technology and intensive industrial fishing, global fish
catch peaked over ten years ago, in 1997, and has declined since then (Whitty
2006). Aquaculture, or fish farming is often suggested as a solution, but there are
serious environmental problems, and in some cases human health concerns,
associated with the practice. In addition, in many cases it requires a great deal of
ocean fish to feed the farmed fish, making this an incongruous and impractical,
not to mention ecologically questionable, solution.
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Certainly, few people can honestly argue that the world’s fisheries are not
in serious trouble (although a few representatives of the fishing industry did
respond to the Science article with stunning statements of denial). But, the
problem is not given a great deal of attention, even though the implications of the
collapse of the world’s fisheries are quite serious. Besides the basic environmental
concerns surrounding the loss of thousands of fish species, damage to oceans and
fisheries may dramatically change the oceans’ ecology. Already threatened or
endangered marine species that rely on the same fish humans do, like whales,
dolphins and other marine mammals, will be pushed closer to extinction by the
loss of their food supply. There are other, less immediately obvious ecological
problems with the collapse of major fish species. Julia Whitty explains that, “the
loss of big fish in the sea is more than an aesthetic loss” (Whitty 2006:40); due to
the disappearance of large fish high on the food chain, and many in the middle as
well, ocean ecosystems are becoming destabilized and are changing. Whitty
points out that one ocean animal thriving in this altered environment, jellyfish, is
becoming more and more prevalent, and causing more and more problems for
humans every year. An ocean with fewer large edible fish, fewer charismatic
mammals, and more jellyfish is not a pleasant thought for anyone, but it’s a reality
we are moving closer to every year.
However, as mentioned earlier, fisheries are not just about fish, they are
about the people who depend on those fish too, and therefore there are many
economic and social reasons to be concerned about fisheries decline. About one
sixth of the world’s population, more than one billion people, depend on fish for
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their main source of protein (Halweil 2006). Many of these people live in Third
World countries where they do not have access to, or simply cannot afford,
alternatives. For them this is a serious matter of survival. As for consumers in the
US, those who can afford to are eating more seafood since our increasingly obese
and unhealthy population is frequently reminded that fish is a very nutritionally
valuable food. As is the case with so many other environmental problems we face,
the impacts will be unevenly distributed; all of us will feel the impact of a global
fisheries collapse, but those hit hardest will be the poor. Sheer desperation drives
poor fishermen to increasingly destructive fishing methods, both to feed
themselves and to supply fish to the wealthy (Whitty 2006:39). In industrialized
nations like the US and Canada, certain regional cultures have historically been
heavily reliant on fishing and seafood. Those places are suffering not only social,
medical, and economic losses; they are also losing part of their local culture and
identity with the disappearance of the fisheries that have sustained them for
centuries. The loss of ocean fisheries as a source of food will deprive many in
wealthier nations of a nutritious food that has long been an important part of
regional diets, and, more importantly, will worsen the huge problem of hunger
and malnutrition in poor regions.
The economic impact of the depletion of the world’s fisheries is already
starting to be felt. Regions where the economy relies heavily on fishing, like
Newfoundland, have been suffering from the collapse of fish species like cod for
several decades. As more species and fishing grounds become depleted, the
economies of more and more “fishing towns” are strained, from Gloucester,
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Massachusetts to San Pedro, California, and from Norway to China to New
Zealand. The first fishermen to feel the strain are those without the resources to
purchase the expensive technological equipment now required to have any
success in commercial fishing, but now even those with the financial means to
keep fishing are finding it hard to catch enough fish. Of course, the international
response has been to fish even more relentlessly, making the problem even worse.
It is estimated that 200 million people depend directly or indirectly on fishing for
their main source of income, and that the fishing industry contributes $80 billion
per year to the global economy (Eilperin 2006). For those reasons, even the least
environmentally minded policy makers, as well as those who argue that the needs
of humans must come first, should not ignore the consequences of the collapse of
fisheries.
This thesis examines the depletion of marine fisheries, as a resource, from
a geographical perspective. In chapter two I will analyze the processes that have
lead to fisheries collapses all over the world, as well as the management
strategies, governance structures and political and economic forces involved, all
with the intention of dissecting this idea of overfishing. I will then discuss the
environmental justice implications of fisheries decline. Chapter three looks at the
collapse of cod stocks in Eastern Canada and New England in the 1990s after
centuries of intensive fishing, dissecting the power relations that lead to it, and its
uneven impact; a case of Third World dynamics in the heart of the First World.
Chapter four looks at the currently stressed and possibly declining fisheries of
West Africa in a similar light; again I will examine the power relations involved,
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and the impact of the decline and a possible collapse. In chapter five I will review
the social and economic consequences of the environmental problem,
emphasizing that each of these fisheries is as much about people as it is about
fish. I will then discuss the strong parallels between these two cases, especially in
the processes involved, and the important differences, specifically the very
different social impacts of declining fisheries in these settings. Chapter five will
conclude with a discussion of what this analysis means for the future, and where
we can go from here.
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TWO
OVERFISHING: A SOCIAL, POITICAL, AND ECONOMIC PROBLEM
In discussing the depletion of fisheries worldwide, it is often forgotten that
fisheries are as much about people as they are about fish. Most discussions
conclude that the simple explanation of overfishing accounts for what is going on
in coastal communities all over the world. This chapter will dissect the idea of
overfishing and argue that it is a complex process. In the first section I will
discuss what is at play in this commonly offered explanation and break it down
into its political, economic, and technological components. The second section
will argue that overfishing is an issue of environmental justice, setting up my case
studies in the following chapters.

Overfishing
“The fisherman’s problem consists as much of
people stealing from each other as it does of people
stealing collectively from nature.” (McEvoy
1986:257)

When the depletion of a fishery is discussed, the inevitable explanation we
are offered is “overfishing,” implying that too many fishermen caught too many
fish for too long and decimated the fish population. It is rare for overfishing to be
examined more closely than that, at least in the mainstream media. However, the
concept of overfishing is far more complicated; if it were simple, fish stocks
worldwide would not be facing irreparable collapse. Overfishing is a complex
process that can be broken down into political, economic, and technological
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components; components which have been combining to bring serious social and
environmental consequences to fisheries for well over a century.
In an article in a 1903 issue of the Journal of the Marine Biological
Association, Dr. C.G.J. Petersen expressed concern that something many thought
to be impossible, overfishing, was occurring in the North Sea. He recognizes
some of the factors involved, including the damage modern bottom trawlers were
doing to fish habitat and populations, and warns that “we cannot ignore the fact
that over-fishing is taking place, and that we must do something if the fisherman
is not to starve and the North Sea become a barren … fishing ground” (Petersen
1903:592). His tone brings to mind the way global warming has been talked about
until fairly recently, addressing skepticism, and attempting to show that this
phenomenon is in fact happening, and that humans are causing it. Over one
hundred years later, we all recognize that the overfishing Petersen discusses exists
and is a serious problem, and while we may have a better grasp of what is
happening, we are certainly no closer to resolving it.
Concern about overfishing is nothing new in North America either.
According to Joseph Taylor, people in the Pacific Northwest have been
“prophesying the imminent demise of salmon for 125 years” and the region has
spent billions of dollars trying to save their fishery (Taylor 1999:3). Worries
about overfishing have lingered in California, on the coast of New England, as
well as on Canada’s east coast for nearly as long. State and federal governments
have been trying to manage these fisheries ever since, usually to little avail. Many
North American fisheries are severely depleted and few of us consider a more
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complicated explanation than the usual overfishing, but since there has been
considerable concern about declining fish stocks for over a century, a simple
explanation clearly is insufficient. Fisheries management in the US and Canada
affects the environment and individual fishers, as well as the cities, regions, and
economies that have historically depended on fisheries resources; those, in turn,
affect the ways fisheries are managed. Despite the fact that concern about
overfishing has existed in some fisheries for over a century, in most cases
management and governance strategies have failed to properly manage the
resource they were designed to regulate and protect, due to the fact that most
management has been done with political and economic, not environmental,
motivations.
In The Fisherman’s Problem, Arthur McEvoy looks not only at the
interactions between ecology, society, economy, and politics, and how each
influences the other; he also emphasizes again and again that fishery management
and politics have, for over a century, isolated the fish both from its natural
environment and from the industry and people that rely on it. Both the
environment of fish, which is in itself highly variable and complex, and the
human institutions that demand and harvest them heavily influence fish
populations, so while isolating fish stocks from both factors makes management
and politics infinitely simpler, this strategy fails to achieve the objective of
actually managing the resource. McEvoy is especially critical of the theory of
maximum sustainable yield (MSY) for its failure to consider the biology of the
fish themselves, natural variations in their environments and populations, and,
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most importantly, the ways fish populations respond to and change under intense
fishing pressure. As Tim Smith reminds us, “fishes ‘cannot be understood out of
context from the intricate system of their biological environment composed of
their predators (including man), their competitors, and their prey’” (Smith
1998:337). Even though MSY was hailed as a precise and scientific model, in
reality, predicting wild fish populations is “more like predicting the weather or the
outcome of an election than, say, the sustainable yield of guppies from a wellmaintained aquarium” (McEvoy 1986:7). There are simply too many fluctuating,
difficult to measure, and interconnected variables involved for fisheries
management to be reduced to such a simple strategy, however appealing it may
be.
An analysis of the interaction between fisheries, societies, economies, and
governments offers insights into the way modern western economics handles (or
rather, often, fails to handle) environmental and social costs. Too often,
discussions of resource economics fail to account for “social and cultural factors
that lead people to use resources, to perceive resource problems, and to respond to
those problems in the ways that they do” (McEvoy 1986:14). Not only is the issue
of fisheries one that needs to be examined in more detail than the usual
explanation of simple overfishing, it can be argued that looking at fisheries offers
insights not only about the ecology, production, and social and legal regulation of
fisheries, but also of society as a whole when it comes to our inability to deal with
our environment.
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In Making Salmon Joseph Taylor takes issue with the way fishery declines
are usually characterized as the simple result of overfishing. He argues that by
solely blaming the fishers themselves for being greedy and fishing too much with
no regard for the future, we lose sight of the social and economic context that
fishers fish within. In other words, to use Taylor’s example, if there were no
demand for salmon, no other pressures on the salmon population, no political
wrangling, and different economic opportunities for fishers, the “overfishing
problem” in the Pacific Northwest (and elsewhere) would not need to be the
subject of countless books, journal articles, campaigns, and laws. By blaming the
fishers exclusively for the loss of the resource they were so dependent on, people
are able to tell a neat, packaged, tragic story while letting all other implicated
parties, which include most residents of the Northwest according to Taylor, off
the hook.
Contemporary understandings of nature and science, a misguided faith in
the ability of technology to solve complicated social problems, an unwillingness
and/or inability to implement politically difficult regulatory measures, and
unwavering commitment to an economic philosophy incompatible with
preserving fish or the livelihoods of fishers have all combined to create the
complex situation most of us boil down to “overfishing.” The simple explanation
of “too many fishermen, not enough fish” does not properly account for the
effects of social conflict, political maneuvering, and the steady march of
economic development at all costs in the collapse of fisheries. Until these
processes are faced and properly understood by environmental managers,
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policymakers, and the general public, there is little hope that we will be able to
effectively manage our fisheries, or many other natural resources.
Despite problematizing the term overfishing in this chapter, I will use it at
times in this thesis to refer to the complex process that I will dissect in the
following sections. When I use this term in this thesis, I use it to refer to the
complex phenomenon with ecological, political, and economic, as well as
physical and technological components. When used not as an explanation, but to
describe a process, this problematic term becomes useful.

Political and economic elements of overfishing
One of the most important, and often overlooked components of the
process of overfishing is the role of politics and economics in depleting fish
populations. Given that by the early 1900s state and national government agencies
in the US and Canada both began to recognize that fish stocks were in fact not
infinite as their predecessors had assumed, and therefore that there would need to
be regulations if they hoped to preserve this valuable resource for the future, how
is it that the twentieth century saw some of the our most prolific fisheries collapse
to a level from which they may never recover? McEvoy explains this in the
context of the philosophies about nature, science, technology, and economics of
the era. In California, as well as the rest of America, in the early twentieth century
the ideology of the frontier was still a very important force in the way citizens and
policymakers alike thought about nature and resources, especially the ocean. The
idea of man conquering and taming wild and abundant nature still resonated, and
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there was a feeling that there were always more fish to be caught, and always new
places to fish. There was little room in this way of thinking for conservation or
regulation of access to resources. At the same time, scientists understood little
about the biology of fish beyond what was immediately commercially relevant,
and nature as a whole was not understood or valued except as it was useful to
human economies. Therefore, much of the failure to manage fisheries can be
attributed to the fact that policy makers of the day managed to separate fish from
both the economic forces that drove their harvest and the ecological ones which
made their numbers fluctuate naturally (McEvoy 1986). This left them few
options, which, given the political climate that heavily favored growth at any cost,
were ineffective at best.
McEvoy offers an example of political divisions playing an important role
in the overfishing of California’s fisheries, which, like so many others, were
difficult to regulate in their early days because of the fractured, ethnically diverse,
and divided nature of the fishery, and because of the frontier mindset that
dominated California and its economic policy at the time. West Coast fisheries
have long been an important industry of immigrants, which means that social,
racial, and ethnic tensions lay just beneath the surface of many disputes over
access and management. In California, the large and diverse immigrant
populations sought to carve out familiar and profitable niches for themselves in
the state’s rapidly growing, resource driven economy. Italians, Chinese, and many
other, mainly poor, communities turned to the state’s rich fishing grounds for their
livelihoods; at first a set of informal regulations allowed specific ethnic groups
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exclusive claims on certain fish species and “everything [was] governed by laws
which fishermen [had] made for themselves” (McEvoy 1986:96). In being able to
regulate and protect their own fishery and piece of the market, fishers could
stabilize their communities socially and economically by keeping competition and
harvesting down, and fish prices up. However, as more and more people entered
the fishery, and the stocks came under more intense pressure from more efficient
commercial operations, conflict over the fishery generally erupted along
ethnic/racial and class boundaries. There was no politically simple solution to
solve the problem of increased pressure on the fishery; instead of making difficult
decisions, it was easier to blame a villain, and in this case immigrants were an
obvious, politically weak, popular scapegoat (McEvoy 1986). In New England
and Canada, as chapter three will show, ethnic divisions were less of an issue, but
conflict commonly erupted along class lines. As the fisheries came under more
and more pressure, hostilities between groups of fishers intensified, with each
accusing the other of overfishing. The line of fracture was different, but the theme
was the same; as fish stocks declined, it was always someone else who was doing
the overfishing.

Physical and technological elements of overfishing
As important as political and economic factors have been in creating
situations of overfishing, technological advances as well as management decisions
have played a very important role in the physical devastation of fish populations.
Taylor examines the “durable crisis” of the slow decline of salmon fisheries in the
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Pacific Northwest in this context. Taylor explains that “fishery management
developed from a tangled alliance of politics, science, and technology during a
specific period of history” and managers sought a “technological solution to a
series of vexing social and political problems” (Taylor 1999:68). He examines
carefully the contemporary view in the early twentieth century that science and
technology would balance the damage economic development inflicted on the
environment, and perhaps improve upon the way nature worked in the process.
The social and political conflicts in fisheries become even more
complicated when fishing fleets begin to mechanize; this is a pattern that has
repeated itself all over the world. The same process that occurred on the west
coast of the US that McEvoy describes in such detail also occurred in the east
coast cod fishery and is currently underway off the west coast of Africa.
California had rich resources, including fisheries, but the state’s residents were
unable to fully exploit them until they also had cheap, abundant energy, and this
was, and is, true for fisheries worldwide as well. Large inputs of fossil fuels
dramatically change fisheries, bringing tremendous wealth and capacity to the
fishery, and eventually decimating once abundant fish stocks. Mechanization
allows bigger boats to fish farther out, and catch more fish faster with less
manpower. Increasingly, poorer fishing communities find themselves pushed to
the margins of the industry, while well-funded boats, often capitalized by large
companies, gain importance and power. In most cases governments become even
more unable and unwilling to regulate the ever-growing mechanized, industrial
fleets. In California, New England, Canada, and countless other cases, the
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dramatic technological change ends up hurting more than it helps; by allowing
fishers to exploit new fish stocks as the old ones disappear, mechanized fishing
disguises declining catches, at least for a while. Further, mechanization
transforms the social aspects of fishing, changing who fishes where and for what,
and alters the balance of power considerably towards those who can afford to
upgrade their gear. Mechanized fishing not only allows fishers to more fully
exploit their fisheries, it also ties the fishing industry more closely to the larger,
interdependent, fossil fuel reliant economy, which makes the fishery more
vulnerable to seemingly unrelated economic and political events, even as
mechanization greatly increases the pressure on fish stocks from the industry
itself (McEvoy 1986).
Taylor offers another cautionary tale regarding technology when
discussing the role of hatcheries in fisheries decision-making in the Pacific
Northwest, this time about relying on technical solutions to solve complex social
problems. Hatcheries have not been particularly important in New England and
Eastern Canada or in West Africa (yet), but his warning applies to a reliance on
management and fisheries science in the case of the US and Canada, and may
apply to Africa too, as more and more people are suggesting fish farming as a
solution to that region’s fisheries problems. Taylor explains that after so many
years of promoting hatcheries, managers were reluctant to admit their strategy
didn’t work, and to this day continue to layer “technology on technology” to such
an extent that “they [have] lost sight of the underlying social roots of the
problem” (Taylor 1999: 230). A misguided faith in the ability of hatcheries and
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other technology to solve the problem of declining runs combined with political
and social conflicts that defined other aspects of management to create what
Taylor calls the “excruciatingly long disaster” of the decline of the Northwest’s
once abundant salmon.

Analyzing overfishing
The complicated and uneven history of fisheries management in the US
has had profound social and environmental consequences. The processes and
themes discussed above continue to be played out in fisheries all over the US and
indeed the world. The economics of fisheries, especially as they decline, often
leads to stark divisions within the fisheries themselves, and, the divided sides
search to find someone to blame rather than examining the more complex reasons
behind the decline. The search for someone to blame becomes mired in struggles
for social legitimacy and political considerations, losing sight of the ecological
damage at hand. In too many cases science and technology, based in skewed or
misunderstood views of nature and fish, are expected to save fisheries. But,
behind all this, is the basic view of economic development as good and inevitable,
and a willingness to sacrifice fish and fishers alike in the name of such
“progress.” This complicated set of processes played out not only in McEvoy’s
California fisheries and in Taylor’s salmon runs; it is still being played out in
various forms in declining fisheries worldwide.
As early as 1915 W.F. Thompson proved that “the simple addition of more
gear to a fishery could sustain increasing harvests long after the resource had
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begun to decline” (McEvoy 1986:158). Thompson emphasized that scientists and
managers could not study depletion of fish populations and their environment
without also looking at the economic forces driving the harvest. Clearly then,
policymakers knew the dangers faced by California’s and other fisheries long
before they declined and collapsed, but there was little anyone was willing to do
to stop it. A frontier mentality combined with undying faith in economic progress
hobbled any meaningful effort to save the fisheries until it was too late. In the
1960s, during negotiations over the future management of California’s then much
depleted fisheries, Wilbert McLeod Chapman, an industry “cheerleader”,
observed that if one wishes to effectively regulate a fishery it is necessary for the
industry to have gone broke first, in order for participants to be willing to
cooperate with serious management changes and conservation measures (McEvoy
1986). McEvoy shows in his analysis how, for reasons of social divisions at first,
and as time progressed considerations of economics and politics, efforts to
manage California’s once abundant fisheries were ineffective at best and an
outright failure at worst. As he explains in his conclusion,
“Economic distress was the goad to public action
and economic gain the gauge of its effect. The
resources themselves were passive objects of
technological and political manipulation, while the
harvesters’ freedom to use the fisheries as they saw
fit was an article of faith. The real causes of
depletion- social costs transmitted to the fisheries
ecologically and the social forces that sustained the
Hobbesian struggle of all against all in which the
fishers were trapped- went entirely unaccounted.”
(McEvoy 1986: 251)
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Though both McEvoy and Chapman were speaking about California’s fisheries,
they may as well have been talking about the east coast cod fishery, or any other
fishery that has collapsed under tremendous pressure, since the process in
California is eerily similar to what occurred in New England and Eastern Canada.
McEvoy emphasizes again and again that the story of fisheries depletion
not only shows us the environment, economics, and politics colliding at the
expense of fishers and fish, but also offers a broader lesson about the ways
Americans approach environmental and resource-based problems, and how that
approach dooms us to repeat the cycle he describes over and over.
As fragmented as the commercial fishing industry was in the early
twentieth century Pacific Northwest, all commercial fishers faced a huge political
threat from the growing influence of sport fishermen, or anglers. Sportsmen
wished to preserve salmon runs for their own recreation, and as the region became
more urbanized, the number of residents whose views of nature and fish matched
those of anglers grew dramatically. Anglers too claimed to be pushing for
conservation, but Taylor points out that the very economic pursuits and
development that had brought so many recreational anglers to the region were
probably doing more harm to salmon populations than the much vilified, though
politically weak, commercial fishers. Despite the rhetoric of the angler’s political
lobbying, they did little for conservation, simply replacing commercial catches
with recreational ones, and completely ignoring the other factors affecting salmon
populations. In the end, most commercial fishers who were displaced by the
efforts of the politically powerful anglers simply turned to the sea for their
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livelihoods, fishing from ecologically abysmal ocean trawlers, and thus further
contributing to the decline of salmon runs anyway. As Taylor concludes, “anglers
did not intend to harm salmon, but their political agenda and economies
nevertheless played a central, if unexamined role in the escalating destruction of
runs” (Taylor 1999:202). Taylor uses the example of the anglers to caution
against being uncritical of our own impacts on declining fisheries while blaming
fishermen. Though the situations are different, it is important to remember the
role of non-fishers in the debate about overfishing in the case studies in chapters
three and four of this thesis.
These patterns that together comprise overfishing have repeated
themselves in New England and Canada, with disastrous results for the people
who relied on those fisheries. The most worrisome part is that those same patterns
are now showing themselves in West Africa.

Environmental justice in marine fisheries
Though the gloomy prognosis for the world’s fisheries over the next few
decades has serious implications for the US and other industrialized nations, the
impact on developing countries in the Third World will be far worse. Too often
people discuss the potential loss of marine fisheries as a purely environmental
problem, not recognizing that “fisheries are as much about people as fish” (PEW
2003). This is not a problem for the distant future either; the very real impacts of
the decline of major fish species are already being felt in fishing communities all
over the world. As with so many other environmental problems and resource
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issues, the benefits and costs of the tremendous overfishing of the world’s oceans
are extremely uneven, with the poor, in industrialized nations and especially in the
Third World, suffering the most and receiving few if any of the short-term
benefits. This uneven distribution of negative environmental impacts and the
extremely unequal power relations involved in the exploitation of important
fisheries make this issue one of political ecology and environmental justice.
Environmental justice started as a social movement in the (Southern)
United States in response to racially unequal environmental circumstances, where
a marginalized group (usually a minority, almost always poor) suffers a
disproportionately heavy burden of environmental risks and harms without
experiencing the environmental benefits that other wealthier, non-minority
citizens do. Laura Pulido emphasizes the importance of geography in
environmental justice because it is all about relationships between places, which
are inherently spatial (Pulido 2000). Environmental justice is often a fiercely local
issue (ex. where an environmental hazard is located), but these conflicts do not
only occur at the local scale; decisions about environmental costs and benefits are
often made at the state and/or national level, and now are frequently influenced at
the international level as well.
Political ecology is very similar to environmental justice, except that it
started out as an academic field not a social movement, and most often tends to
study rural cases in the Third World, while environmental justice has traditionally
been an urban and First World concern. Political ecology looks at how people and
societies interact with the environment, and puts those interactions into a political
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economy perspective. Human interactions with the environment are inherently
political and economic, especially common conflicts studied by political
ecologists like resource use, environmental policy, and environmental
change/degradation. Political ecology emphasizes the importance of power
relations and the social/political creation of vulnerability. Again, political ecology
looks at relationships and interactions between places, which is inherently
geographical.
These overlapping and intertwined frameworks of environmental justice
and political ecology are concerned with spatially, socially, economically, and
politically marginalized groups suffering disproportionately from environmental
degradation while receiving none of the benefits reaped by those who exploit the
environment. Marginalization and exploitation in the international economy and
the unequal distribution of environmental costs and benefits is fundamentally
what is at issue in global fisheries depletion, therefore, though neither the fisheries
of the Northwest Atlantic or West Africa are traditional settings of environmental
justice, they are in fact distinct cases of environmental injustice, and need to be
examined within this framework.
At the heart of any discussion about justice in fisheries, is the issue of
environmental governance, and the conflicts that governance generates.
Environmental governance can be thought of as the “institutional arrangements
through which decisions about natural resources are taken, and the management
practices by which those decisions are enacted” (Perreault 2006:151). In the case
of fisheries, governance usually occurs across several levels. At the local level
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both formal government regulations and informal arrangements among fishers
allocate the use of the resource. Federal laws, as well as economic policies and
subsidies act at the national level. There are also international structures of
governance, all of which combine to govern the use of the resource. These levels
of governance will be discussed further in chapters three and four. The institutions
that govern fisheries have created gross inequalities in access to and use of the
resource, generating conflict between those who gain from exploiting fish stocks,
and those whose livelihoods are most negatively impacted when those stocks are
depleted. The unequal power relations that generate such governance structures,
as well as the extremely uneven distribution of environmental benefits and
consequences of exploiting fisheries resources, make the overfishing of marine
fisheries worldwide an issue of environmental justice. This thesis focuses on
issues of environmental justice in a First World setting, the Northwest Atlantic
cod fishery, and a similar, but Third World, case in West Africa.
At the local level, the collapse of crucial fish species has been a concern
for several decades in some communities (as I will show in the next chapter), but
what makes the current situation particularly alarming, is that overfishing has
gone global. The collapse of important fisheries in the global North, especially in
the US, the EU, Canada, and Japan, has fueled ever more intense, industrial
fishing in an effort to keep up with growing demand. Seafood is as popular as
ever in industrialized nations, and high prices have lured those fleets to the waters
of Third World countries in search of valuable fish. The fisheries of many of these
developing nations are already strained by their own growing populations, and the
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addition of industrialized foreign fleets is a serious threat. For nearly one billion
residents of developing countries, the implications of the loss of their fisheries are
more drastic than higher seafood prices; for those whose main source of protein is
fish, this is a matter of survival (Halweil 2006).

Unequal Power Relations
Having extensively overfished their own waters, the fishing fleets of the
First World have descended on the global South in search of fish (and profits). As
Becky Mansfield (2001a) points out, these fleets were purposely developed and
supported by their own governments, and in many cases the decimation of
domestic fish stocks was government sponsored. Now, all that excess capacity
(much of it heavily subsidized) is turning to the waters of developing countries for
fish. In theory, Third World nations have a powerful international law on their
side, allowing them to keep foreign fishermen out of their waters. Established to
protect these vital fisheries in the developing world, Exclusive Economic Zones
give countries territorial rights over the 200 nautical miles of ocean off of their
coasts (Mansfield 2001b). As Mansfield discusses extensively in her work,
countries like the United States and Japan have used this increased power and
territory to their advantage, building up their fleets to better exploit their new
resource and developing complicated agreements with those who wish to fish off
their coasts (Mansfield 2001a). Ironically, the developing countries this new
system was designed to protect have been the ones least able to make it work to
their benefit. While the US, the EU, Japan, and others have the money and power
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to build and often subsidize their fleets and manage and regulate their fisheries
(PEW 2003), most Third World governments are either too poor, too corrupt, or
too weak (or some combination of these) to regulate, let alone truly build and
manage their fishing industries. Mansfield points out that EEZs have been a
tremendous benefit to those states that have managed to effectively exploit them,
but in order to do that they first had to establish and maintain control over their
new ocean territory. Simply having an EEZ does not guarantee that a nation can
control it, and those countries unable to manage their coasts have also been unable
to benefit from them the way much of the First World has (Mansfield 2001b).
The effective exploitation of First World oceans has indirectly dealt
another blow to those countries unable to exert effective control over their EEZs
because they found themselves in a weak bargaining position when
representatives of First World governments came looking to negotiate fishing
rights in Third World EEZs. First World governments now offer money and
sometimes aid to developing countries in exchange for access to their fishing
grounds. On the surface, this type of agreement seems like it would allow
developing nations to benefit from a natural resource. However, usually the
money involved is a sizable amount to a poor country, but a tiny fraction of the
money sunk into industrialized fishing fleets, and the developing nations are in no
position to refuse this kind of “bargain” with more powerful countries (Clover
2006). Fishing is no longer a small-time enterprise since industrialized fishing
methods are prohibitively expensive, so these unequal power dynamics allow for
First World governments to negotiate for multinational corporations to exploit yet
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another resource rightly belonging to a Third World country. And, as in many
other situations of resource exploitation, there are also unequal power dynamics
within the developing countries, further marginalizing those who depend on
fisheries for their livelihoods and survival. The people who rely most on fishing
for food and employment are usually economically marginal within their own
countries, and have little or no political power as a result. Often when fishing
rights are negotiated with powerful First World countries, the agreements are
made with local political elites, not those who will be directly affected, which
means that the people with the most immediate stake in how domestic fisheries
are managed have no voice in the decision making process. Clearly, unequal
power relations at the global, national, and local levels leave developing nations,
especially the poor within those nations who are most likely to be dependent on
fish for survival, at a huge disadvantage when dealing with international fishing
fleets from powerful industrialized countries.

Impact on Developing Nations
Just as the power distribution and relationships that determine how
fisheries are governed are extremely uneven, the impacts of overfishing and
depleting those fisheries are also uneven. As Becky Mansfield emphasizes in
multiple articles, there are many different forms and manifestations of
neoliberalization and exploitation of the oceans, but “all forms entail reducing the
options of those who once relied on public fisheries, while giving to those who
qualify a form of wealth that can then be used for further gain” (Mansfield
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2004:323). As those with wealth gain access to and/or control over fisheries, the
people who suffer the most are those fishers with little wealth or power. This is
true in both First and Third World situations, but is most pronounced and
widespread in the cases where industrialized (and in the case of the Third World,
foreign) fishing fleets gain, through the exploitation of unequal power dynamics,
access to economically and socially vital fisheries. Poor, local fishermen cannot
afford to compete with industrialized fleets for fish, since these fleets employ
expensive technologies and extremely efficient methods (though these techniques
are actually inefficient in the long run). First World, industrialized fishing boats
use GPS and sonar (“fish finders”) to locate and track schools of fish in places
that were previously inaccessible (Whitty 2006). Industrial fishing techniques like
trawling, and the use of longlines and driftnets, catch more fish in a few hours
than small scale, low-tech local operations could hope to catch in days. Not only
does the use of industrial fishing methods mean there are fewer fish in the sea for
local fishermen to catch, these methods also catch and kill many juveniles of
important species and smaller fish lower on the food chain as “bycatch”, making
these practices at once efficient and impressively wasteful (Whitty 2006).
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Industrial trawl net and destruction of sea floor (from National Geographic)

Bycatch, thrown overboard as trash (from National Geographic)

Both by killing other sea life and by destroying ocean habitat, these industrial
practices damage the entire ecosystem, depleting fish populations and reducing
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chances of recovery and future productivity (Whitty 2006). Faced with this kind
of competition, local fishermen turn to more desperate methods that are also
ecologically harmful. As the populations of larger fish dwindle, fishermen, both
foreign/industrial and local, turn to populations of fish farther down the food
chain. Fish that would not have been considered edible a decade ago are now not
only being eaten by those in the Third World with few alternatives, but also are
being caught and sold in industrialized nations, as once popular fish are becoming
too rare to meet ever growing demand. This is a dangerous turn of events because
by turning to the fish that are farther down the food chain, we damage the
ecosystems of struggling fish species, further jeopardizing their chances of
recovery. Marine scientist Daniel Pauly also finds this trend alarming because it
indicates that we are rapidly running out of fish species to turn to and are having a
more dramatic impact on the ocean than most people realize (Pauly 2000).
Unfortunately, the negative impacts of overfishing in the waters of
developing nations do not end there. Not only does competition drive local
fishermen into unemployment, it often deprives them and their families of an
important source of nutrition and a substantial part of their diet. Fish that local
populations used to rely on for their main source of protein are now sold instead
on the international market; and even if they still reach local markets, these fish
are too expensive for those who cannot afford any alternatives and depend on
seafood for their survival. The loss of fish as a staple food contributes to
malnutrition and health problems among the poor, often disproportionately
impacting women and children (Halweil 2006). Foreign exploitation of fisheries
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in developing countries also undermines any efforts within local fishing
communities at cooperation and/or fisheries management. In this way, the
exploitation of Third World fisheries is very much like the exploitation of other
resources in this era of globalization (especially essential ones like fresh water).
Demand on the global market influences local economics and power
relationships, and poor, marginalized populations are the ones who feel the
consequences most acutely.

West Africa and the EU
The dynamics and situations I have described above play out, with
obvious local variations, all over the world, especially in Africa, Latin America,
the South Pacific, and Southeast Asia. There are hundreds of cases that fit within
the basic political ecology framework, most in the Third World and/or between
First World and Third World countries, though there are a few within the First
World. The case of the European fleets in West Africa, discussed in detail in
chapter four, is typical in many ways, though because of the history between these
regions, it has some distinct undercurrents as well.
Europeans love seafood and in many places it is an important part of local
cuisine. However, very little fish eaten in Europe is actually caught in European
waters, because most fish stocks there have been drastically depleted for years.
The EU increasingly turns to the global South, specifically Africa, for fish to feed
its wealthy, seafood-loving population. Africa has been an ideal region for
exploitation both because it is relatively close to Europe, and because large parts
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of the continent are poor and/or unstable, making these areas easier to exploit.
Despite the stated socially and environmentally responsible goals of the European
Union, the actions of European fishing fleets in West Africa have been just the
opposite. EU fleets have turned to one-sided agreements with West African
nations, paying a relatively small amount (often in the tens of millions) in
exchange for the right to bring in economically and ecologically damaging
industrial fishing fleets.
Many find the entire situation even more reprehensible because the EU’s
highly regarded policy guidelines, which state that EU interactions with the
developing world should “reduce poverty and promote sustainable development”
(Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002) looks like pure hypocrisy in the face of what
European fleets are doing in Africa. It should also be pointed out that the
exploitation of an African resource by Europeans at the expense of local
populations has a very “imperial echo” (Clover 2006: 45). Most of West Africa
was at one time under European colonial rule, and exploited for resources and
labor. Even though African nations have technically entered into agreements as
sovereign nations, not as colonies, the unequal power relations, and history of
exploitation of resources at the expense of the poor in Africa, give these
accusations weight.
The history of exploitation and imperial undertones of this situation in
West Africa tie it to another case of political ecology and environmental justice,
thousands of miles away. In his account of the history of resource extraction in
the upper Amazon, Soren Hvalkof emphasizes that a history of exploitation of the
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land, resources and people continues into the present (Hvalkof 2000). In the upper
Amazon, the resources and actors have changed over time, but the patterns have
not. This holds true for West Africa as well; today it is fisheries being exploited
and depleted at the expense of locals, in the past it has been other important
natural resources, from agricultural products to raw materials, metals, diamonds,
and of course, slaves. While the specifics of the case in the upper Amazon are
quite different than those in this case in West Africa, the underlying patterns,
histories, power dynamics, and uneven outcomes/impacts are all too similar.
Mansfield also emphasizes the importance of the history of resource use in a
particular place in determining how that resource is used and/or exploited today
(Mansfield 2001a). This is especially important when it comes to something like
fish, which is at once viewed as a highly necessary “common good”, vital to the
lives and livelihoods of locals, and as an internationally demanded commodity.
As is commonly revealed by an environmental justice and political ecology
analysis, the current situation in West Africa’s fisheries is one where non-local (in
this case global) processes have a huge impact at the local level (Mansfield
2001a). Though they may not realize it, seafood buyers in the First World are now
often competing with those in the Third World for the increasingly scarce
resource of fish. As is too often the case, the poor, marginalized populations lose
out, unable to compete or defend their livelihoods against global processes and
demands.
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Conclusion
In her analysis of what she calls “the new geography of the oceans”,
Becky Mansfield explains that the combination of the creation of Exclusive
Economic Zones, and the increasingly global nature of the fishing industry, “has
created new possibilities for resource exploitation as well as resource
management” (Mansfield 2001a: 393). What she means is that the system of
EEZs that was intended to protect Third World countries from resource
exploitation by industrialized nations and allow them to manage their own
resources has not only failed to protect those countries, in some cases it has
enabled the creation of exploitive agreements. Unequal power dynamics have and
will continue to ensure unequal outcomes unless environmental justice and
political ecology considerations are taken into account. Going forward, as the
situation of the world’s fisheries becomes more and more dire, it will be essential
that we consider not only the environmental costs and benefits of policies and
actions, but the social impacts as well.
When viewed as an issue of political ecology and/or environmental
justice, the situation of marine fisheries, especially in the Third World, is certainly
one of fish, the environment, and biodiversity, but most importantly it is a case
about people. Attempts to “save the ocean” need to be explicitly tied to efforts to
save the communities and people that depend on the ocean for their survival.
Fisheries and ocean management are about fish and the environment, but the link
between the health of fisheries and the health of large percentages of the world’s
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population, physically, socially, and economically, cannot and should not be
ignored.
The processes that have occurred in Northeastern North America and that
are occurring in West Africa are quite similar in many ways, and I argue that each
is an issue of environmental justice broadly conceived. However, as the next two
chapters will show, New Englanders and Canadians who were reliant on the
fishery have certainly suffered, but they weren’t and aren’t in danger of
starvation. Even in today’s neoliberal political environment, the governments,
especially Canada’s, have tried to help struggling fishing communities. There is
no such support structure in place if and when West Africa’s fishery fails.
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THREE
NORTHWEST ATLANTIC COD FISHERY
The depletion and collapse of the Northwest Atlantic cod fishery is
extremely, perhaps excessively, well documented from a variety of disciplinary
perspectives, with particular attention to the New England states in the US and
Newfoundland in Canada. In this chapter I will discuss the specifics of this fishery
and its importance to the region, then discuss the processes that lead to its
dramatic (and seemingly sudden) collapse in the early 1990s. In discussing the
run-up to the collapse I will focus on power dynamics in decision-making, and on
the differences within the fishery in terms of who has benefited and who has
suffered from what policies and impacts. I will also discuss what has happened
since the collapse, focusing most on the fishermen who were left without a
livelihood or who are watching it disappear.
The prolific cod fishery along the coasts of the New England States of the
US and the Maritime Provinces and Newfoundland-Labrador of Canada, has been
an important resource for this region since the earliest European settlers came to
North America. Cities and towns from Massachusetts to Maine to Newfoundland
were built with the help of cod; whose seemingly endless numbers directly and
indirectly supported economies for hundreds of years. However, in the early
1990s, with little warning, the great cod stocks collapsed dramatically, forcing the
Canadian government to close its most important fishery (which has yet to
reopen) and eliciting a similar response from American officials. Though some
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fishermen had warned that cod populations were under stress, the collapse was
largely a surprise to fisheries scientists, the fishing industry, and the general
public alike, and those coastal communities heavily dependent on the fishery for
their livelihoods were left reeling. Over fifteen years later, many of these
communities still bear the scars of economic displacement from the collapse.
Clearly then, the collapse of the Northwest Atlantic cod population was more than
an ecological disaster, it was a serious social and economic disaster as well. This
chapter examines the processes and dynamics that lead to the dramatic collapse of
the cod fishery as well as what its impact has been on the people who were
dependent on that resource. This will set up a comparison to chapter four, the case
study on West Africa.

Fishery as a resource
Ecology
The cold waters of the Northwest Atlantic are rich in nutrients and home
to a great variety of marine life, including cod. For this region, Atlantic Cod were
the most important, most abundant, and most intensively fished species for
centuries. They thrive in cold water, are omnivorous and easy to catch, and are
prized for their white, protein-rich meat (Kurlansky 1997).
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Atlantic Cod

Cod, and other economically important species, as well as whales and
other marine life, tend to concentrate on the “banks”, shallow regions of the
continental shelf. the warm Gulf Stream meets the cold Labrador Current off the
coast of New England and Canada, creating an ideal environment for sea life from
the plankton and tiny fish at the bottom of the marine food chain, all the way to
large predatory fish and marine mammals. The most important of these banks for
New England are George’s Bank and Stellwagen Bank. For Canada, it is the
Grand Banks. Their abundant sea life and proximity to shore have meant that the
banks have been the site of intense fishing efforts as well as conflicts, and a
source of wealth for New England and Eastern Canada, for hundreds of years.
New Englanders were known to refer to “the sacred cod” and the fish can be
found as a decorative symbol of wealth in many of the region’s old buildings.
Though their populations fluctuate naturally with changes in water temperature
and food supply, cod are highly adaptable and resilient fish; as late as the turn of
the last century, Canadian officials honestly believed it was impossible for cod to
be anything but abundant far into the future. Kurlansky (1997) remarks that
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despite this, the cod were undone by a predator even more greedy and omnivorous
than they are: humans.

Cod (from the Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador)

For example, George’s Bank, the source of the Massachusetts fishery’s
wealth, has historically been home to large numbers of cod, haddock, and
flounder. A combination of extremely intensive fishing efforts by a large
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industrial fishing fleet and damage to the habitat of these bottom-dwelling species
by bottom trawlers stressed these populations to the point of collapse. According
to a recent PEW Oceans Commission report on American fisheries, in 1980 cod
catches peaked at 115 million pounds, and by 1994 cod catches had dropped to
only 30 million pounds despite increased fishing effort and improvements in
technology (PEW 2003: 12). The report goes on to estimate that more than 20,000
New Englanders lost their jobs when the cod stocks collapsed, with devastating
impacts on coastal communities (PEW 2003: 12). Those small fishing operations
that managed to stay in business turned to other species, including scallops that
thrived in the absence of their natural predator, the cod, and awaited the return of
cod stocks, which some experts fear will never come. The report offers the
startling fact that “by 1999, what were once the most valuable fisheries in this
fishing rich region of the nation accounted for only four percent of the region’s
total catch by value, and three percent by weight” (PEW 2003:12).
The Canadian government had been concerned about its fisheries for
years, but largely ignored the warning signs that a collapse was imminent. In July
of 1992, they declared a moratorium on all cod catches, but stocks have shown
few signs of rebounding even fifteen years later. In places like Newfoundland,
where the majority of the population was, in some fashion, linked to the fishery,
and fishing formed the basis of the economy, the results of the collapse were not
only locally, but regionally devastating.
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Canadian Cod Catch

Local importance
Northeastern North America’s fishing grounds have sustained fishing
communities for hundreds of years. The past century has seen a distinct division
appear within the fishery between the large, industrialized off-shore fishing fleet,
and the smaller on-shore fleet based in coastal communities. The off-shore fleet is
usually capital-intensive, owned and run by corporations, and uses industrial,
destructive fishing methods to catch massive quantities of fish. This fleet, due to
its size and technological advantage can fish far out to sea. The on-shore fishery,
on the other hand, is made up of “smaller, community based fishing operations
[that] are typically looked upon as the mainstays of coastal communities,
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providing diverse jobs in local economies” (PEW 2003: 3). The differences and
dynamics between these two fisheries are often compared to the situation in the
farming industry with industrialized agribusiness and family farms. In fact, many
economists and fisheries scientists have expressed a desire to transform the
fishing industry in a fashion similar to the way agriculture was completely
transformed in the twentieth century. However, despite decades of calls for
consolidation and privatization, Northwest Atlantic fishing communities have
resisted this trend, with some limited success. My focus will be on the on-shore
fishery as this was the sector hardest hit by the cod collapse, and is where this
situation becomes an issue of environmental justice, though not in a traditional
environmental justice setting.
Kevin St. Martin describes in detail how on-shore fisheries typically
function including dynamics between fishermen and their ties to the larger
community. The systems he discusses are the very ones fishing communities are
struggling to protect in the face of declining fish stocks and economic and
government pressures. Most on-shore fishing operations are family run, often
going back many generations. Coastal fishing communities are described as
“networks of fishermen and the people who support them” (St. Martin 2006: 537);
all elements of this network contribute to, and are affected by, the success or
failure of fishing. This fishery is not capital-intensive, so the investments tend to
be small. Most investment in the on-shore fishery comes from within the coastal
community itself, and most capital generated is either re-invested in the fishery
(even in times of scarcity, when it is not considered economically rational to do
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so), or within the local community (St. Martin 2006). St. Martin explains the
tight-knit nature of the fishing communities, and the centrality of the fishery
within them, saying, “communities are linked directly to the common resources
insofar as each crewmember’s livelihood as well as that of the boat owner is a
function of the health of the resource” (St. Martin 2006: 537). The community
nature of the on-shore fishery is further exemplified by the share system,
“characterized by the rules that govern the distribution of fish catches amongst
boat and crewmembers…in general, when catches are large, boat owners and all
crewmembers involved benefit according to an agreed upon set of proportions,
and, when catches are small, all suffer the same relative loss” (St. Martin 2006:
534). Generally, crewmembers are considered to be co-venturers, even partial
owners, in the catch, not employees, making the dynamic between boat owner and
crew quite different from, for example, the labor relations in modern agriculture,
or most other industries. In fact, most boat owners identify themselves as
fishermen, just like their crews, and most crewmembers plan to own their own
boats one day; this system appears to be rooted in a deeply ingrained belief in
fairness and independence that runs through fishing communities (St. Martin
2006).
As has happened in so many resource dependent communities in recent
years, there has been pressure on fishing operations to restructure towards a more
capitalist, privatized system. Some of this has been in response to the problems of
the fishery, as many economists see the “un-capitalist” nature of fisheries as the
reason for their failure (overlooking, of course, that most of the damage is done
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by the distinctly capitalist, large scale operations), but some of this pressure is
simply part of the larger neo-liberal trend towards privatization of resources to
increase profit. As Perreault explains, in this movement towards privatization,
“resources…are no longer conceived of as public goods that individuals have
rights to as citizens, but rather as scarce commodities whose access for consumers
is mediated by the market” (Perreault 2006: 153). This is certainly true in the case
of the Northwest Atlantic’s fisheries; cod had long been considered a public good
that was owned by no one. Access to the fishery was by no means open, as most
fishing communities had unofficial claims to specific fishing grounds, but
“fisheries in general defy any straightforward assignment of property
rights…because many economically important fish species are highly mobile”
(Sneddon 2007: 174). This neoliberal push towards privatization and other
restructuring threatens the local governance of the fisheries and the share system,
and thus the entire structure of small scale fishing communities. In their efforts to
resist these changes, fishermen emphasize, “the entirety of what might be
undermined: community, local economies, small businesses, and their
‘livelihoods’….such rhetoric often has the effect of relegating the concerns of
fishermen and fishing communities…to a romantic or archaic vision of fishing
communities” (St. Martin 2006: 538) and thus does little to help their cause.
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North Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) map of the Northwest
Atlantic, showing continental shelf, important banks, and EEZs.
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Governance dynamics
The abundant cod fisheries of this region were also considered an
important international commodity, which meant that members of the on-shore
fleet were not the only ones concerned with, or involved in, its governance. In a
recent article, Schroeder et al. comment on the presence of the types of dynamics
one might expect to find in the Third World existing in First World settings,
saying that “the same forces that produced the Third World as such are
responsible for creating peripheries…within advanced capitalist nations as well”
(Schroeder et al. 2006). As St. Martin co-authored the article, Schroeder et al. use
the Northwest Atlantic fisheries as a prime example of this; a corporate off-shore
fishing industry runs up against a small scale, community based fishery in a
dynamic that is usually associated with the Third World.
Davis et al. emphasize again and again that the on-shore and off-shore
fisheries represent “two distinctive vested interests” and point out that the
conflicts between their interests are “exacerbated by the role and activity of the
federal and provincial governments” (Davis et al. 1984: 110). Even though the
Canadian Atlantic fishery seems to have been in a state of perpetual crisis for
years, the most recent problems are rooted in the creation of Canada’s EEZ and
the “overly optimistic expansion” of the fishing industry in the following years
(Davis et al. 1984: 108). Years of policies that have been detrimental to on-shore
fishing operations and the communities that depend on them have made
fishermen, and often whole communities, dependent on government welfare
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programs and services, creating a sense of bitterness, hostility, and powerlessness
in many coastal communities (Davis et al. 1984). Conflicting government
jurisdictions and motivations has added to conflict and on-shore fishermen’s
frustrations with government policy. The federal government has jurisdiction over
Canada’s EEZ and marine resources, and is forced to balance the corporate
interests of the off-shore fleet with the “populist pressures” from coastal
communities built around the on-shore fleet. The provincial governments have
some jurisdiction over their immediate coastal areas, and therefore the realm of
most on-shore fishermen, but are more attuned to the interests of the large
corporate processors and the off-shore fleet (Davis et al. 1984). Both federal and
provincial governments tend to view the off-shore, corporate sector of the
industry as “economic” and the on-shore, community based sector as “social.”
This division not only implies that the on-shore fishery is not economically
important, it forms the basis of government policies that have bolstered and built
up the off-shore fishing fleet, while essentially placing the on-shore fleet on
welfare, keeping the sector “alive but not viable” (Davis et al. 1984: 119). They
also point out that the division into two extremely different sectors puts the onshore fishermen at a further disadvantage as far as having their voices heard, or
being involved in the decision making process. It is clear that the government has
tended to be “much more likely to be responsive to a unified sector with a clearcut definition of its interests, as opposed to a diverse, fragmented, and dependent
sector” (Davis et al. 1984: 121).
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The on-shore vs. off-shore dynamic is exemplified, albeit unintentionally,
by the last of five major task forces on fisheries in the past hundred years
organized by the Canadian government before the cod stocks collapsed: the Task
Force on Atlantic Fisheries, which was issued in 1982. The biases in the report,
specifically the favoritism shown to the off-shore fishing fleet at the expense of
the on-shore sector, have been subject to sharp criticism for the continued
government support of these policies, despite strong evidence that this is just the
wrong sort of policy to pursue. Government policies that have harmed, but just
barely sustained, the on-shore fishery, while supporting the growth of the offshore fleet, are directly responsible for the environmental disaster of the cod
collapse, and its harsh social consequences in coastal fishing communities.
Barrett et al. (1984) argue that, “the thrust of the report and subsequent policy
implementation in Newfoundland is to encourage concentration and centralization
of capital onshore and at sea. It is our contention that this policy is ill conceived
as it bails out big capital yet again, supporting and making stronger what, in our
view, is the chief cause of the industry’s problems in the first place” (Barrett et al.
1984: 126). The Task Force follows in the footsteps of many government reports
before it (and, for that matter, most other writings on the problems in fisheries) by
claiming that the “common property” nature of fisheries resources is the root of
all of the problems in the industry. The report does not discuss more recent
information indicating that the community structures that regulate in-shore
fisheries seem to be quite effective in managing fishing grounds. It is believed
that, contrary to what the Task Force would have you believe, “for inshore/near
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shore fishermen with deep historical-familial roots in their communities, making a
living neither requires nor features the hostile and chaotic behavior predicted by
the common property perspective. Socio-economic life is, in fact, much more cooperative and community-managed within these fishing settlements than this
perspective suggests” (Barrett et al. 1984: 128). Instead, it seems that the
“Hobbesian view” of all against all, more accurately describes the behavior of the
off-shore fishing efforts.
The industrialized, corporate-controlled fleet is where fierce competition
drives the use of environmentally harmful fishing methods and drastic overharvesting in an effort to turn a large profit as quickly as possible, with little
regard for the environment, other fishermen, or the future of the resource. Despite
the claims of economists that large, vertically integrated, capital intensive, and
often state-subsidized fishing operations must be more efficient than smaller
operations, they are actually far less efficient in the short term due to the
tremendous capital invested in them (not to mention the energy they need just to
operate), and are environmentally disastrous in the longer term. Smaller fishing
operations are also more efficient because, thanks to being far less capital
intensive, they are able to adapt to seasonal and longer-term variations in fish
stocks that prove quite harmful to larger, less flexible operations (Barrett et al.
1984). Barrett et al. sum up the deep inequities in how the government approaches
the problems in the fishing industry in their conclusion that, “the Task Force’s
recommendations are intent on providing a brighter, more certain future for the
corporate sector – all at a direct cost to independent fishermen, small fish
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processors, and many fisheries-dependent coastal communities” (Barrett 1984:
134). Though Barrett et al. and others brought these criticisms several years
before the infamous collapse of the cod stocks, it is clear that these researchers
recognized that the current fishery policies employed by the government were not
only deeply inequitable, but also placing the entire industry on the road to
disaster.
This inequitable, uneven power dynamic operated, even in the heart of a
wealthy, First World country. Though this section has focused on Canadian
fisheries, a similar dynamic played out in the New England fishery, with the
major difference being that the United States is a less generous welfare state, so
struggling on-shore fishing communities received less government assistance. In
each case there was, according to Davis et al., a “failure of those existing political
structures to allow adequately for the small boat fishermen’s participation and
control of decision-making which affects their own fate” (Davis et al. 1984: 121).
In hindsight, it seems that the only stakeholders who saw this coming were
the on-shore fishermen, whose catches began to decline years before the collapse
was officially recognized. Kurlansky points out that, “in the 1980s, government
scientists had ignored the cry of inshore fishermen that the cod were
disappearing” and says that the predictions of small boat fishermen that the
offshore trawlers were devastating the cod populations turned out to be
unfortunately accurate (Kurlansky 1997: 3). What happened in the Northwest
Atlantic cod fishery is a prime example of inequalities in governance precipitating
an environmental, and consequently social, disaster.
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Collapse
How did this happen?
How did one of the world’s most prolific (and managed) fisheries collapse
so suddenly? The same policies that left the on-shore fishery at such a tremendous
disadvantage compared to the off-shore fishery, also set up the collapse of the cod
population. Privileging the industrial fleet did more than harm coastal
communities; it allowed the giant off-shore trawlers to destroy the habitat of vital
fish species and harvest unsustainable levels of fish. Even though the worst
environmental damage was done by the off-shore fleets, the sector of the industry
that suffered most was the in-shore fishery. Small boat fishermen had been
expressing their concerns about the catches of the industrial fleets for years, and
they were some of the first to notice that stocks seemed to be in trouble (Ommer
1985), but their voices were barely heard above the din of economic growth. It
was only after the collapse that their concerns were given credibility.
Rosemary Ommer, in an effort to understand the collapse and look for
ways to deal with it going forward, approaches her examination of the fishery
with the adage, “history teaches us that men and nations behave wisely once they
have exhausted all other alternatives” (Ommer 1994: 5). She blames the
overcapacity in the industry created with the establishment of the EEZ and the
associated overly optimistic expectations of the fishery for precipitating the
collapse. The government, as well as fisheries scientists and managers, allowed,
and in many cases encouraged this growth through subsidies and other incentives,
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which “contributed to the stress on the resource and raised expectations that could
not be fulfilled” (Ommer 1994: 14). Most of the excess capacity was in the
industrial, off-shore fleet which meant that this was not a case of “too many
fishers catching too few fish” but rather “too much technology destroying too
many fish” (Ommer 1994: 7). Increased technology and increased effort also
maintained catches, even as the historically productive areas became depleted.
The catch figures of the off-shore operations hid for managers what was clear to
many on-shore fishers who watched their catches dwindle: the fishery was in
trouble. Therefore, Ommer concludes, whatever efforts are made going forward
must include the voices of on-shore fishermen, as they were the first ones to
notice something was wrong, and the first ones to be adversely affected. She
argues that, “at last there is something on which we all- fisher, government
bureaucrat, politician and academic- now agree, and it is this: the manner in
which we have thought about fisheries management in the past is demonstrably
untenable” (Ommer 1994: 18), echoing the conclusion McEvoy reached after
examining the collapse of California’s fisheries many years before.

Impact
Kurlansky writes of Newfoundland’s only remaining cod fishery, the
Sentinel Fishery, which allows a few small boat fisherman to catch a very limited
number of cod for scientific purposes, releasing some with tags for tracking and
killing others for research on age and sex. The very little bit of fresh cod meat this
fishery yields is the only taste Newfoundlanders get of the fish that was a staple of
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their diets for centuries, and the boats are often greeted on shore by lines of
people. During one expedition in early autumn, what was once a very lucrative
fishing season, one Sentinel boat caught 100 cod, weighing a total of only 375
pounds; before the collapse of Newfoundland’s cod stocks, that same small
fishing boat might have caught 300 fish weighing more than 3,000 pounds
(Kurlansky 1997: 13). For a region that has been almost entirely dependent on its
cod fishery for hundreds of years, this is certainly a sad state of affairs.

A fishing community in Newfoundland (from Encyclopedia Britannica)

Up and down the coasts of New England and Canada, the question in
fishing communities is when the cod will come back; few fishermen want to
admit that the cod populations may never recover. One obstacle has been the
“perception problem” where people’s memories are short, and they want so much
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to believe that the cod are coming back that they see any sign of progress as an
indicator that the fishery can reopen. As one Canadian scientist remarked in 1996,
“we found 15,000 cod in the South Bay, and everyone said the cod are back. Hold
on! Ten years ago, the biomass, the population, was 1.2 million” (Kurlansky
1997: 195). This has placed political pressure on managers and made it even more
difficult to craft a sensible fisheries policy going forward.
Certainly the cod collapse had some impact on the international economy
and industrial, off-shore fleets, and it caused international alarm. However, those
who really suffered were the on-shore fishermen. They couldn’t fish elsewhere
and most did not have the capital or the skills to move into another industry. The
on-shore fishermen were the ones hit hardest by a disaster caused by a series of
decisions from which they were excluded. And it wasn’t just the fishermen
themselves who experienced hardship; it was whole communities that were built
around and dependent on the fishing industry. As the 2003 PEW Oceans
Commission report explains, “when fishing incomes decline, entire communities
suffer. A variety of socioeconomic impacts resulting from depleted fish stocks
ripple through local, regional, and national fishing economies. Local businesses
that benefit from fishing income also suffer. A host of less visible social problems
often accompanies such economic distress” (PEW 2003: 10). Like the economic
dislocations caused by the deindustrialization of the “rust belt,” struggling fishing
towns face the unenviable situation of having to turn away from what has long
been their economic staple. In New Bedford, Massachusetts, and other struggling
fishing ports throughout New England and eastern Canada, Family Fishing
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Assistance Centers, and similar networks of nonprofits and aid organizations, are
helping thousands of fishermen, fisheries workers, and their families leave the
fishing industry in search of more stable employment. Few fishermen, either those
leaving the industry or those staying to tough it out, are particularly optimistic that
things will get better. “The management process has overlooked the
people…[they want] to see the environment and the fish stocks protected, [and
they want] equal consideration for fishing communities” (PEW 2003: 13).

Conclusion
Unequal power dynamics, where politically marginalized on-shore
fishermen’s interests are at odds with politically and economically powerful
corporate, industrial off-shore fleets, allowed unsustainable exploitation of the
Northwest Atlantic’s cod fisheries. Those whose livelihoods were most dependent
on this once abundant resource were the ones with the least say in the decision
making process that lead to its decimation. The on-shore fishermen did not benefit
from the overly intensive, industrial fishing of the northwest Atlantic and they
were the ones who suffered the consequences when the fish stocks collapsed.
Many on-shore fishermen’s, and indeed whole communities’ livelihoods
are destroyed, and many are having to rely on government assistance; however,
Canada, and to a lesser extent the United States are able to cushion the blow for
their citizens, and it is unlikely that anyone is actually going to starve. As
Kurlansky points out in describing the long lines that often form for the scant
catch from the Sentinel fisheries in Newfoundland, “this is Canada. These people
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have jobs or are on public assistance, mostly the latter these days. They are not
hungry but simply yearning for a taste of their local dish. The big fish companies,
the ones that owned bottom draggers that had cleaned out the last of the cod
before the moratorium, now import frozen cod…but these people are accustomed
to fresh, white, flaky cod” (Kurlansky 1997: 13). And, this, the situation of those
who suffer most from the loss of the fishery, is where the cases of the Northwest
Atlantic and West Africa, are distinctly different, as the next chapter will discuss.
As chapter four will show, the processes and power dynamics in the Northwest
Atlantic and West Africa are starkly similar, but the social consequences of
depleting the West African fisheries will be far more severe.
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FOUR
WEST AFRICA’S FISHERIES
Fisheries are not usually the first resource that comes to mind when
resource conflict in West Africa is mentioned. Oil and diamonds are far more
commonly discussed and receive exponentially more media attention. However,
fisheries are a valuable and important resource for the coastal region of West
Africa, and have been so for hundreds of years (Marquette et al. 2002).
Traditionally, coastal communities have relied on fisheries for their main source
of protein as well as their livelihoods, and this pattern continues in many places
up and down the coast today. However, local fishermen are no longer the only
ones fishing off of West Africa’s coast; foreign industrial fleets are taking huge
catches for international markets each year. Long seen as one of the world’s last
remaining productive fisheries, the West African fish populations are starting to
show signs of severe stress from overfishing. The overexploitation of this
resource threatens more than just the ecology of the region; it is having very
serious social and economic impacts on an already unstable region, and the
region’s poor are being especially hard hit. If, or as many experts say, when, the
West African fish populations collapse under the same pressures that other
fisheries world wide have succumbed to, an already struggling region of Africa
will face further social and economic hardship. In this chapter I seek to examine
what is happening here, what processes are at work, and how this is affecting the
region. I will argue that the situation in West Africa is a serious matter of
environmental justice, and that the patterns emerging are strikingly similar to
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what happened in the Northwest Atlantic. However, because of this case is in the
Third World, what will happen to the millions of Africans who rely on this fishery
will be quite different.

Fisheries as a resource
Ecology
Africa’s west coast, from Mauritania south all the way to Congo, consists
of rich and incredibly diverse marine ecosystems. The warm tropical waters are
home to many fish species, from the locally important sardinella, to
internationally sought tuna species.
West Africa (from http://www.afropop.org/explore/show_region/ID/1)

This region’s environment sustains so many fish because the West African
continental shelf is a site of ocean upwelling. Cooler, nutrient rich water rises to
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the surface sparking growth of phytoplankton, zooplankton, and other tiny
organisms forming the base of the food web. This in turn supports a variety of
larger species, many of which have commercial value. Typically, there are two
main upwelling events each year, one minor in December and January and one
major in late July, August, and September (Marquette et al. 2002). Fish
populations fluctuate and migrate through the year, influenced by the upwelling
events and normal fluctuations of the Guinea Current which runs along the coast.
Evidence suggests that conditions off the west coast of Africa are strongly
influenced by El Niño Southern Oscillation events in the Pacific Ocean, as well as
variations in rainfall and climate on the African continent (Perry and Sumaila
2007). Thanks to variable global weather patterns and their seemingly direct
impact on the environment in the east Atlantic, the West African fisheries
experience wide variability not only on the scale of months, but over several
seasons and even decades. Different species prosper in different oceanic
conditions, and research has shown that a drop in abundance of one set of species
due to a change in climatic conditions often corresponds to a rise of another
species favored by those changes (Perry and Sumaila 2007).
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Phytoplankton, stimulated by upwelling off the coast of Mauritania (from NASA)

The West African continental shelf is home to hundreds of species of fish,
cephalopods, crustaceans, and other marine creatures including turtles (Perry and
Sumaila 2007). Some of the most commonly fished species are sardinella,
anchovy, triggerfish, grouper, bream, octopus, shrimp, lobster, shellfish including
scallops, and several species of tuna (Perry and Sumaila 2007). Although overharvesting and habitat destruction by the fishing industry is the primary concern
here, the marine ecosystem of West Africa is also threatened by pollution from
urban centers, agriculture, mining and oil production, and global warming.

Local importance
The rich ecosystem of Africa’s continental shelf has supported large
fishing communities for centuries, and today most of the region’s citizens live
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within one hundred kilometers of the coast (Marquette et al. 2002, Perry and
Sumaila 2007). Most countries still have large artisanal fishing fleets; these
fishermen still fish from canoes using various forms of nets and lines. The work is
labor intensive, involving many community members, both male and female, and
often employing entire families. Traditionally, coastal populations fish both for
subsistence and for business. They rely on the fish they catch for protein and
nutrition, and as their main source of income. Usually the male members of a
community are the fishermen, but the women are in charge of processing and
reselling the fish. Fish caught in this way feed people well beyond the borders of
the fishing villages, often contributing an important, and less expensive, source of
protein for those in urban centers and inland areas. It is estimated that West
Africans consume an average of twenty to twenty two kilograms of fish per
person per year, compared to around eight kilograms per person elsewhere in
Africa, making fish an extremely important source of protein in the region (Dioh
1998, Perry and Sumaila 2007). Few residents can afford more expensive
alternatives to this vital dietary staple such as bushmeat (wild animal) or domestic
meat; a 1998 report stated that it is typical for fish to be one third the cost of a
comparative amount of beef (Dioh 1998). Therefore, the health, as well as
economic and social situations, of millions of West Africans is connected to the
state of the region’s fisheries.
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International importance
As discussed earlier in this thesis, fish have been an important
international commodity since the 1600s (if not earlier), but their importance has
grown in recent years. The twentieth century has seen seemingly inexhaustible
fish stocks collapse around the world and, simultaneously, an ever growing
demand for seafood. As species of fish become rarer they also become more
valuable, providing even more incentive for those enterprising fishermen and
companies who can afford to do so to invest in all the latest fishing technology
and head for the remote corners of the sea in search of under-exploited fishing
grounds (Whitty 2006). Having depleted their own once abundant stocks,
European, American, and Asian fishing fleets have turned to the Third World in
search of more fish to satisfy increasing demand. Africa is a popular destination
for these fleets, and the rich, relatively underexploited waters of West Africa have
attracted the attention of large, foreign industrial fleets. Residents of traditionally
seafood eating nations in the First World continue to demand seafood and are
often unaware that their shrimp scampi, tuna salad, and fish ‘n chips come from
the waters of struggling Third World countries. Increasingly the quest to satiate
global demand for seafood is straining the vitally important fisheries of places like
West Africa. The depletion of these fish stocks pits the local populations that
depend on them against a wealthy global market willing to pay exorbitant prices
for the very fish poorer Africans desperately need (Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002,
Clover 2006).
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Foreign fishing activities in and off the 200 mile EEZ of the Sub-Saharan West African
States (from Kaczynski and Fluharty, 2002)

Governance
International fisheries governance
As mentioned in chapter two, in the late 1970s the international
community devised a new system of ocean territorial boundaries and governance
stipulating that each country has economic rights to the ocean shelf for two
hundred miles off its coast. This area is known as the country’s Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ). Whatever resources lie within that zone, whether they be
fisheries, oil deposits, or other resources, belong to that country to exploit and
manage for themselves; they can sell the rights to resources within their EEZs just
as they can with any other resources. EEZs were devised in an effort to give Third
World countries more control over their coastal resources, because during the

64
1970s many poor nations, especially in South America resented that their fisheries
and resources were being exploited by wealthy foreign fleets and they were
powerless to prevent it (Mansfield 2001a). Extending territorial rights was
supposed to give struggling nations more power over their own resources and
allow them to benefit from those resources. Ironically, the very system that was
supposed to benefit developing nations has made them more vulnerable and has
allowed industrialized nations to exploit those natural resources (Mansfield 2004).
Nations like the US, Japan, and European countries under the European Union
have made various arrangements with countries in South America, Africa, and
parts of Asia to exploit their “under-utilized resources.”
In West Africa the primary exploiter of African nations’ EEZs has been
the European Union. The EU negotiates “cooperation” agreements with the cashstrapped governments of African nations allowing EU member states to fish in
African waters. For a relatively low price, industrial European fishing fleets are
able to gain access to African waters, often with few restrictions; those
restrictions and conditions that are put in place in the agreements are rarely
enforced. The European fleets remove large quantities of fish from African waters
with their advanced technology and huge ships. Often, no processing occurs on
African shores and no African fishermen are employed by the European boats
(Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002). EU boats are often expected to police themselves
since the African governments involved do not have the money or power to
enforce even the lenient regulations that exist.
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The way harvesting capacity is often regulated in such agreements
provides an excellent example of the way these arrangement are structured to
maximize EU profit while avoiding any control by West African states.
According to Kaczynski and Fluharty (2002) fishing agreements between the EU
and West African nations regulate capacity by gross registered tonnage (GRT)
which is a measure of vessel size, and which has very little relation to actual
capacity to harvest fish. Combined with the fact that EU fleet operators, not West
African officials, are given the authority to make most decisions regarding
regulation of the fleet, this means that “[the] EU is in position to manage the
intensity and patterns of coastal resource exploitation practically without any
consultation with the coastal state” (Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002: 78)
The first of the two figures that follow shows the size of the EU fishing
fleet authorized to operate in the waters of five West African nations, by GRT and
the number of tuna boats, and the yearly compensation each nation receives from
the EU for this use of their EEZ. The second figure shows the FAO fish capture
statistics for those same countries, for the past five decades, as well as each
country’s population and coastline.
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Size of fishing fleets authorized to operate in coastal waters of West African states by
agreements and yearly compensations paid by the EU between 1981 and 2006 (from
Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002)

67
Mauritania

Guinea-Bissau

Population: ~3 million
Coastline: 720 km
Senegal
Population: ~1.2 million
Coastline: 274 km

Guinea
Population: ~10 million
Coastline: 718 km
The Gambia

Population: ~8.5 million
Coastline: 300 km

Population: ~1.5 million
Coastline: 70 km

FAO Capture Production Fishery Statistics
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As these figures show, these are relatively small countries with relatively
little coastline, and yet a tremendous amount of fish is extracted from their waters
each year, much of it by European fishing fleets. However, because of a lack of
regulation and chronic under-reporting, we don’t know exactly how many fish
European fleets are actually catching. It is clear from the proceeding figures that
GRT, yearly compensation, and the state of the fishery are not connected in EU
policy towards West African fisheries. For example, Senegal has allowed the EU
to fish in its waters since 1979, but intense fishing meant that, according to the
FAO, catches peaked ten years ago. Nevertheless, a new, rather dubious
agreement was signed in 2002 with some new features to appease the Senegalese
government (such as a requirement that a certain amount of the tuna catch must be
processed in Senegal each year), but overall lacking in conservation measures or
limitations on catches (Clover 2006). The fishing industry in Senegal employs
over 600,000 people, some in the country’s own industrial fleet, and many others
in the small scale operations that fish from canoes, called pirogues, and many of
them stand to be negatively impacted by this agreement (Clover 2006). Clover
maintains that members of Senegal’s industrial fishery “question the legality of
the access agreement now that stocks are clearly overfished, and the artisanal
fishermen are angry that the agreement was signed behind their backs” (Clover
2006: 50). Despite the agreement’s unpopularity, Senegal’s government signed it
because, as one official emphasized, for a country as poor as Senegal, $75 million
is a lot of money (Clover 2006). Kaczynski and Fluharty (2002) express concern
that not only are the Senegalese people left with the environmental consequences
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and social disruptions, once the fishery stops producing fish for the EU, this
important stream of revenue will dry up and Senegal will be left far worse off
than before, with nothing to show for years of cooperation with the EU.
In Guinea-Bissau, in addition to exploiting the tiny nation’s only
significant resource and a potential economic asset, EU policies are actually
inhibiting development and perpetuating dependency on fishing agreements. The
EU avoids investment in Guinea-Bissau because it is seen as “risky” and there is a
perception that use of the fishery is the only thing the country has to offer. This
means that fisheries agreements remain the chief source of government revenues,
over forty-five percent, making the government even more beholden to the EU
(Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002) and leaving them with no leverage in negotiating
agreements. Worse, when the fishery begins to decline (FAO data indicates that
this may already be happening) the country will be left stripped of a resource that
could have acted as a stepping-stone to development and welfare improvement,
and with nothing to fall back on. In both cases, and indeed in most West African
countries, as was the case in the Northwest Atlantic, those most reliant on the
fishery have little or no say in its regulation as the source of their livelihoods is
exploited and destroyed for someone else’s short term gain, and are left with the
long term consequences.
The policy guidelines of the European Union state that EU relations with
the developing world should “reduce poverty and promote sustainable
development” (Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002). However, this guideline is
obviously not being followed in European fisheries policy. By negotiating these
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exploitive fisheries agreements with West African nations, the EU is in direct
violation of its own stated goals, but when confronted with the conflict, European
officials and industry spokesmen have maintained that fisheries policy is “just
business” and therefore has nothing to do with development policy (Kaczynski
and Fluharty 2002). This thin excuse is hardly justification for taking large
quantities of vitally important fish (and therefore protein) from African waters in
order to turn a profit.

National fisheries governance
The setting out of Exclusive Economic Zones put the control of such
zones and the fisheries within them that had been in the control of local coastal
communities in the hands of national governments (Mansfield 2004).
International fisheries agreements, in particular ones granting access to fishing
grounds within a nation’s EEZ, are negotiated with national governments. In the
case of West Africa, the national governments which negotiate the agreements are
not the most important stakeholders. The small-scale local fishermen do not have
a say, and therefore the agreements often barely take into account potential impact
on African fisheries. In West Africa few national governments have the human,
technological, or financial resources available to properly monitor, let alone
manage, fisheries, which means that even though those governments technically
have jurisdiction in their EEZs, they usually have little power to regulate local
fisheries, and even less to police international fishing fleets in their waters.
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Regulating artisanal fisheries is challenging due to the sheer numbers of
boats and fishermen and the often informal and migratory nature of artisanal
fishing communities and structures. Common measures to regulate domestic
fishing include bans on specific types of gear and fishing methods, requiring
licenses, and regulating net mesh size (Perry and Sumaila 2007). In those West
African nations that do have domestic industrial fleets, like Senegal, such fleets
tend to be under-regulated, and once again, enforcement tends to be lax. Poor
regulation of domestic fleets can also serve as a loophole for foreign companies;
in many countries ships may be registered to a citizen, but the ship and crew are
foreign and the harvest is sold at foreign markets (Clover 2006). Industrial fleets
are difficult to regulate because most of what they do occurs far offshore, and in
the case of the foreign fleets, the numbers and capacities of the industrial fleets
drastically exceed and overwhelm those of the African governments attempting to
police them. National governments have slightly more success regulating their
own domestic fisheries, though as Marquette et al. (2002) note, regulating
artisanal fisheries is of far less value than properly limiting and policing the more
damaging industrial fleets, both foreign and domestic. Though it often falls on
national governments to regulate the fisheries within their borders, those in West
Africa lack the resources, and often political will, to oversee the monitoring and
regulation of this valuable resource. This regulatory structure allows national
governments to negotiate away rights to their EEZs without having to take on any
of the responsibilities jurisdiction over those zones is supposed to entail.

72
Recent fisheries agreements often contain some limitations (usually easily
avoided) on international fleets in territorial waters. These limitations usually
involve limiting licenses, limiting tonnage of fishing boats in a fleet and various
forms of quota systems, most of which are structured to allow the EU to
maximize their access to the fisheries. Such restrictions are unevenly and laxly
enforced at best (Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002). For example, in the waters of
Senegal, European fishing boats officially report catches of 13,200 tons of fish
landed per year, but some estimate that the actual number landed is closer to
88,000 to 110,000 tons per year (Clover 2006). Kaczynski and Fluharty claim
that even if they were properly instituted such limited regulations would not
adequately protect the environment, fish stocks, or local fishermen from harm.

Local fisheries governance
In many of the region’s coastal villages, fishing is done from wooden
canoes, some powered by small motors, others powered by sails and oars. These
boats are usually crewed by male family members using a variety of gear
including set nets, drift nets, purse seines, and beach seines, as well as some hand
nets and lines, depending on where they are fishing, what they are fishing for, and
what types of gear are available and affordable (Marquette et al. 2002, Perry and
Sumaila 2007).
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Fishing boats in Ghana (photo by Michael Sarver)

While fishermen themselves are usually men, women are also heavily
involved in the fishing economy. Once the fish is brought to shore, the women,
usually wives and female relatives of the fishermen, take over. Women are
responsible for all processing and marketing of fish, including cleaning, salting or
drying (in a few cases freezing), and selling at local markets (Marquette et al.
2002). This type of fishery is certainly small scale, but the people in the
community do not fish purely for subsistence; much of what they catch is sold at
market to local residents, and to those in urban and/or inland areas. For thousands
of coastal communities throughout West Africa, fish are an important resource for
their health, economic well-being, and society.
As is the case with small-scale fisheries in many regions, West Africa’s
local fishing communities have definite, though informal, institutions of
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governance. It is often assumed by fisheries managers and bureaucrats that
“common fisheries” are unregulated and open to all, but in many instances, that is
simply not the case. Marquette et al. also describe the governance structures of
such communities, using the example of coastal villages in Ghana. Fishing
communities in Ghana usually have a leader or chief figure who serves as an
informal regulator of the fishery and mitigates any disputes that arise. This person
is consulted on important matters not only by the members of the community, but
also by leaders of other communities, and often by local government officials as
well. These informal regulating structures become especially important during
variations in environmental conditions and fish stocks. Over the years local
fishing communities have adapted to the fluctuations and changes in the fish
populations, and due to these governance structures have been fairly resilient to
natural environmental variation. However, as industrial fleets are adding even
more pressure to the system, and threatening those fish stocks the small-scale
fishermen and their communities rely on, there is concern about the ability of
local governance structures to continue to mitigate the effects (Perry and Sumaila
2007).
West African fishermen have also developed other coping strategies to
deal with fluctuations in fish populations, though it is unclear how well these
adaptations will work in the face of a dramatic decline in fish populations. When
fish stocks are low fishermen diversify their incomes by taking on other forms of
work (often repairing boats and gear), and when possible, will switch to another,
more abundant species of fish. If neither of these options is feasible, fishermen
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migrate, usually seasonally though sometimes for longer periods of time, and
sometimes taking their entire family (and therefore fishing operation) with them.
Even when they migrate to villages of different ethnic groups and other countries,
these fishermen integrate into the local fishing community, respect local
institutions, and create new institutions of their own (Marquette et al. 2002).
While this kind of migration and other coping strategies have worked well as
methods of dealing with natural fluctuations in fish stocks, they may not be viable
options as West African fisheries decline from intense fishing pressures.
Local governance structures in this region are largely unofficial, and often
unwritten, sets of rules and customs, as discussed above, but they should not be
ignored or brushed aside. Too often fisheries managers ignore these kinds of local
governance, assuming artisanal and small scale fishermen have no knowledge of
or desire to protect the resource their livelihoods depend on (Lawson and
Robinson 1983). National and international decisions and processes seriously
undermine local governance and the communities where such governance is at
work. By granting foreign fleets access to West African fisheries, national and
international actors have opened heavily used fish stocks up to additional
pressures, and forced small scale local operations to compete with large
international fleets and companies. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the
governance structures in place at the local level have implications for policy
making at the national and international levels, and may help in developing more
practical ways to protect fisheries over the long term.
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Impact on West Africa
The ecological impact of international, national, and local demands on
West Africa’s fisheries is becoming increasingly severe. Though still in much
better shape than many fisheries in Europe and North America, it is believed that
the West African fishery is under great stress and in danger of collapse. Daniel
Pauly, a preeminent authority on fisheries decline world-wide, estimated that
since 1945, West Africa’s abundant fisheries have declined at least fifty percent
(Clover 2006), which means fifty percent less fish for local fishermen to catch as
they compete with international fleets. Perry and Sumaila (2007) suggest that
many species have declined fifty percent in only two decades, including shrimp,
octopus, and some demersal species, and they point out that estimates of total
decline tend to hide the shifts in composition of species brought on by fishinginduced changes in the ecosystem. Pressure from local fleets has surely played
some role in this, but a great deal of the strain on West African fisheries comes
from foreign, industrialized, technologically advanced fleets. The size of
industrial fishing boats allows them to fish far from home, and technology like
GPS, radar, and “fish finders” allow these fleets to fish in areas that were
previously inaccessible to smaller scale operations which had provided fish stocks
with a place to regenerate. These industrial fishing technologies that have allowed
Europeans and others to over harvest their own waters are also placing West
African fisheries at risk.
Trawls, longlines, and drift nets, all operated by powerful machinery, take
more fish from the ocean in a few hours than a small scale operation can take in
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days. These technologies cause additional ecological harm through their levels of
bycatch and habitat destruction. They not only capture large quantities of the fish
they were intended to catch, they also snare juveniles which are too small to keep
and/or have not had a chance to reproduce, and other species of ecological, and
sometimes commercial importance. Most of this bycatch, which makes up
roughly a quarter of total biomass caught (sometimes more depending on the nets
used and species caught) is thrown back into the ocean dead and dying, and is not
reported or included in catch totals (Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002, Whitty 2006).
Bycatch from a shrimp trawler (from National Geographic)

Trawling also devastates marine habitat, making it much more difficult for
depleted fish stocks, and the marine ecosystem as a whole, to recover. The impact
of trawling on marine environments is commonly compared to the impact of clear
cutting on rainforests. Considering the ecological damage caused by the
industrial fishing fleets in West African waters, it is not surprising that the
region’s once productive fisheries are yielding smaller catches, smaller individual
fish, and fewer commercially important species, even with increased fishing
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efforts. Unfortunately, common small scale fishermen’s reactions to the effects of
overfishing in their waters tend to make their own situations even worse. Their
initial coping strategy is to fish harder, work longer hours, venture farther from
their usual grounds, and harvest more and more of the remaining fish (Perry and
Sumaila 2007). It is not uncommon for desperate fishermen to turn to more
destructive fishing methods, including using dynamite and cyanide, thereby
compounding the damage done by industrial fishing fleets to the coastal
ecosystem.

Senegalese pirogues and trawlers often compete on the same fishing grounds (from National
Geographic)

The health of local fishing communities is closely tied to the health of the
fishery resources they depend on, so as West African fish stocks decline, the
coastal regions suffer. At the most basic level, fishermen must either fish harder
and invest more time, energy and money for dwindling catches or give up fishing
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in favor of another line of work. Many have spent their whole lives fishing, and
have little education and few other marketable skills, and often there are few other
jobs available (Allison and Horemans 2006). Foreign fishing fleets rarely employ
local workers, and the fish those fleets catch is almost never processed on African
shores, so no new jobs replace those lost in the small scale fishing fleets
(Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002). Perry and Sumaila say that in Ghana alone,
roughly 100,000 jobs were lost in only four years (1992-1996) due to
corresponding declines in fish catches and rising fuel costs, which made fishing
via motorized canoe uneconomical (Perry and Sumaila 2007). The women who
process and market the fish also suffer as fisheries decline, which often means
that entire families are deprived of their livelihoods (Perry and Sumaila 2007).
Associated sectors of the economy that supply fishermen or rely on their catch are
also adversely affected. People in fishing communities, whether fishermen or not,
are heavily reliant on fish for protein and nutrition, so as fish become scarce,
prices go up, and as an important sector of the economy declines, the entire
community is affected directly.
The impact of overfishing in West African waters does not end at the
coastal fishing villages however. Since fish has traditionally been the cheapest
and most abundant source of protein, citizens of urban centers and inland areas far
away from fishing communities also rely on fish for food. The poorest people are
hurt first by rising prices and fewer fish, and since they often cannot afford
alternatives, they risk malnutrition and hunger. The impact of the loss of a once
abundant and important food source hits many people however, not just the poor,
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and can reverberate through the local and regional economies. The social
structures and economies of coastal fishing communities are seriously
undermined by the loss of their main source of income and food, and these are the
areas hardest hit by overfishing. However, the impact doesn’t stop there, since a
shortage and/or price increase of a staple food item touches the lives of many,
many people, and can have far reaching consequences for the economy and social
fabric of a region.
The parts of West Africa that will be hit hardest by continuing declines in
fish stocks are also those areas that are least able to cope with the consequences.
Governments of too many countries in this region lack the ability to ease the blow
of failing fisheries for their citizens, just as they lack the power to properly
manage those vital fish stocks in the first place. The story of declining fisheries
resources due to exploitation for international markets follows closely the pattern
set by many other stories of resource exploitation in West Africa and other
regions. The major difference is that West Africa’s fisheries are far more essential
to the daily lives of West Africans, both those in coastal communities and
elsewhere, than resources like diamonds and oil.

Conclusion
West Africa’s fisheries are an important resource with local and
international value; however, global demand seriously threatens local access to,
and use of, this vital resource. As mentioned several times in this chapter, data on
this region’s fisheries can be difficult to obtain and is often inaccurate. Fisheries
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management is challenging enough with accurate data, and this makes the case of
West Africa even more difficult, and urgent, to address. The decline of West
African fisheries means the region will face increased malnutrition,
unemployment and poverty, negatively impacting the already struggling economy
and social fabric. West Africa is certainly not the only region where the loss of
important fisheries is a serious problem, but West Africa is one of the regions that
is and will continue to be hardest hit by the global fisheries crisis, and is least able
to cope with its consequences.
The processes underway in West Africa are eerily similar to those that
precipitated the collapse of the cod fishery in the Northwest Atlantic, however, as
will be discussed in the next chapter, the social impact will be far more serious
because these nations are for the most part unable to soften the blow to their
citizens, and lives, not just livelihoods, are likely to be in jeopardy.
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FIVE:
CONCLUSION
The preceding chapters have examined the depletion of marine fisheries,
as a resource, from a geographical perspective, and argued that this is an issue of
environmental justice. Chapter two dissected the concept of overfishing into its
political and economic, and physical and technological components. This allowed
me to analyze the processes, ideas, management strategies, governance structures,
and other forces that have lead to fisheries collapses all over the world. I then laid
out why the global fisheries crisis is an issue of environmental justice. Chapter
three looked at the collapse of the prolific cod stocks in New England and Eastern
Canada, examining the unequal power relations that precipitated this disaster, and
its highly uneven impact. This is certainly a case of Third World power dynamics
occurring in the First World. Chapter four then looked at what is happening in
West Africa’s fisheries with a similar view. The processes and power relations are
quite similar, but the impact of a collapse will be far more devastating. This last
chapter will review the social and economic causes and consequences of this
environmental problem and provide a comparative analysis of the two case
studies, pointing out their many similarities, as well as their crucial difference.
From there I will discuss what we can learn from this, both in terms of fisheries
policy going forward, and in issues of environmental justice and natural resource
use more generally.
The cases of the Northwest Atlantic and West Africa demonstrate the
dynamics at work in the depletion of each region’s once abundant fishery. Though
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the regions are very different in almost every way, from climate, to culture, to
political and economic situation, their cases do share a striking similarity: the
processes that have combined to deplete their fisheries. In both cases unequal
power relations, at the local and national levels leave the small scale fisheries at a
serious disadvantage. In the Northwest Atlantic, small scale on-shore fishermen
lack the economic importance and associated political clout of the corporate,
industrial, off-shore operations. The disorganized, diverse nature of the small
scale fishery also makes it harder for them to make their voices heard, and have
their concerns addressed. St. Martin (2006) says that sometimes the interests of
on-shore fishermen are even undermined by their own arguments about what was
at stake: their focus on livelihoods and communities reinforces perceptions of the
fishery as old-fashioned and un-economic. In West Africa, again, small scale
fishermen are usually poor and politically marginalized within their own
countries, so their interests are not at the forefront of national policies. And, West
African nations are at a serious disadvantage in negotiating access to their
fisheries resources with wealthy, powerful, First World nations. These unequal
power relations leave small scale fishermen with little or no say in a decisionmaking process that profoundly affects them. In each case governance structures
at the local level are undermined by those favoring industrial, capital intensive,
large scale operations, resulting in environmental and social devastation for those
whose livelihoods depend on the small scale fishery.
The difference between these cases then, is all in the impact of fisheries
depletion. True, many Northwest Atlantic fishing communities that had relied on
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cod have been economically and socially devastated. That cannot be denied and
their plight should not be ignored or downplayed. However, as Kurlansky (1997)
aptly reminds us in the case of Newfoundland, the livelihoods of Canadians and
Americans may have been destroyed, but they are not going to starve. Because
these are First World communities, though they may have been victims to a
dynamic more commonly associated with the Third World, their strong, wealthy
governments are able to protect them from the devastating poverty found in the
Third World. In West Africa, the governments do not have that ability. They lack
the financial resources to aid their already struggling populations if and when
their fish stocks fail. Therefore, while the scene in fishing communities up and
down the Northwest Atlantic coast is one of economic and social plight, it is far
milder than what is setting up to transpire in West Africa.
Even though environmental justice is more commonly associated with the
Southern United States, more broadly it involves issues of unequal power
relations and inequitable distributions of environmental costs and benefits. In the
case of fisheries depletion, those who depend on the fishery for their livelihoods
are politically and economically marginal and thus have little say in
environmental decision-making. These unequal power dynamics, between people
and places create a situation where a socially vital resource is exploited and
degraded by industrial, corporate (and in some cases, foreign) fleets, and small
scale fishing operations are left to suffer the consequences when that resource is
depleted. This is what makes global fisheries depletion an issue of environmental
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justice, in First Cases like the Northwest Atlantic, and Third World cases like
West Africa.

Policy Implications
A clear understanding of the processes at work at local, national, and
international levels and just what is at stake is absolutely essential to
understanding the collapse of Northwest Atlantic cod fisheries and the decline of
West African fisheries. Any effective policy measures will have to take local,
global, short term, long term, environmental, economic, and social considerations
into account in order to effectively mitigate the over-exploitation of this valuable,
and potentially renewable, resource.
The collapse of New England and Canada’s famed cod stocks has been
discussed as a lesson to us all about the inability of Western countries to rationally
deal with their environment, and has been framed as an ecological warning. It is
important that we take what happened in the Northwest Atlantic into
consideration in the crafting of fisheries policy, and other environmental policies,
for that matter. In the sixteen years since the cod stocks dramatically collapsed,
the public, the media, and government officials have expressed dismay at what
happened, but there has been little call for real change in fisheries policy.
Trawlers still destroy the ocean bottom of the cod’s habitat, in search of other
species, and there is strong resistance to efforts to protect marine environments,
from fishing as well as pollution and resource extraction. Environmentally, it is
important that a greater effort is made to protect the few cod that are left, and their
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environment, in hopes that their population can recover. However, social policy
must assume that the cod will not return, and aid fishermen and coastal
communities in transitioning to other, more stable livelihoods. And, if the lessons
of the cod collapse are not heeded by managers of other fisheries and
policymakers, more and more communities will share the fate of those in New
England and Eastern Canada.
On an international level, fishery policy cannot be viewed as “just
business” by the European Union or anyone else because all fisheries policies, or
lack thereof, have inherent social and economic implications. Fisheries are not
merely about fish and the environment, they are about people as well, and this
important concept cannot be forgotten. In their analysis of fisheries development
policy, Allison and Horemans (2006) emphasize again and again the importance
of integrating all fisheries policy in Africa (and elsewhere) with broader poverty
reduction measures and sustainable development initiatives. Given the extreme
importance of West African fisheries to the health of the region’s people,
economy and social fabric, exploiting those fisheries at the expense of local
populations is unethical and runs counter to stated African development goals of
the EU and many other developed nations.
The individual countries, the EU, and the international community as a
whole must recognize local need for fisheries resources in West Africa, and give
that need priority, even at the expense of demanding global markets. West
Africans should not face malnutrition and unemployment so citizens of wealthy
nations can continue to enjoy their favorite seafood dishes. In respecting local
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dependence on West African fisheries, if they insist on continuing to fish in West
African waters, foreign fleets need to switch to environmentally responsible
fishing gear and methods. Fisheries can be a renewable resource when enough
members of important species are left in the ocean and allowed to reproduce and
the larger ecosystem remains intact. Fisheries policy in West Africa must
incorporate local governance structures and decision making to have any hope of
protecting the region’s fish-reliant populations. Small-scale fisheries are not
unregulated as national and international stakeholders assume; local governance
structures should be considered and strengthened, not undermined, by large-scale
agreements and policy.
Certainly most of the responsibility for more ethical fisheries policy lies
with national governments and the international community, but consumers of
seafood in the First World need to be aware of where that seafood comes from.
Citizens who are concerned about poverty and underdevelopment in Africa would
probably be horrified to know the source and social cost of some of their seafood.
They should put pressure on their governments to pursue responsible fisheries
policy in West Africa and elsewhere; fear of political disapproval can be a
powerful force in motivating change in fisheries policy. Every can of tuna in
American and European supermarkets bears a “dolphin safe” label, a testament to
the fact that when pressured by consumers, governments and the fishing industry
can be convinced to change irresponsible fishing practices. In the last few years,
what’s going in our oceans has become more prominent in the public
consciousness, largely because of startling articles in mainstream media,
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including Newsweek, National Geographic, and most recently the New York
Times, which ran a feature on the questionable actions of the European Union in
the West African fisheries. So, there is hope that this issue will be addressed,
however as with many other environmental issues newspaper articles and citizen
awareness by themselves are not enough, and if we are to prevent a social,
economic and environmental travesty in West Africa, broad changes in attitudes
and policies will be necessary. Changing national and international fisheries
policy will certainly meet with political and economic resistance, but the
consequences for West Africa and many other Third World countries of
continuing to exploit this essential resource are far too serious to continue our
current direction.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Common industrial fishing methods (Whitty 2006):
Longlining: a widely used method of fishing where a line is strung over miles of
ocean, dangling vertical lines with baited hooks. Long lines are used to catch
swordfish, tuna, and other pelagic (open ocean) fish species, but they also snare
sharks, seabirds, turtles, and marine mammals, in addition to other “bycatch.”
Driftnets: monofilament nets set across tens, even hundreds of miles of ocean,
often at depth. These nets are also indiscriminant, catching and killing a great deal
of sea life that is thrown away as “bycatch.” Drift nets can be especially
problematic when they are lost or abandoned because they are non-biodegradable
and continue to catch marine life.
Trawling: a method of fishing were a (usually weighted) net is dragged across the
ocean floor to catch bottom dwelling species. Not only are the levels of “bycatch”
predictably high, trawling damages the sea floor ecosystems in a manner that
many have compared to clear-cutting forests.

Maximum sustainable yield (McEvoy 1986:6):
A hypothetical point, used in fisheries management and modeling for year where
“fishers take exactly as many fish as the stock recruits in a season and so do not
impair the resource’s long-term productivity. Less fishing, of course, will produce
fewer fish. A higher level of effort, however, will also produce fewer fish in the
long run by leaving fewer adults to breed.”
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WRITTEN SUMMARY OF CAPSTONE PROJECT
My capstone project focuses on the depletion of marine fisheries, as a
resource, from a geographical perspective. I analyze the processes that have lead
to fisheries collapses all over the world, as well as the governance structures,
management strategies, and political and economic forces involved. I argue that
overfishing is a complex process with technical and environmental as well as
economic and political components, and that the overfishing of the world’s oceans
is a serious issue of environmental justice. My project examines this through two
case studies: first, the collapse of cod stocks in Newfoundland and New England
in the 1990s after centuries of intensive fishing, and second, the currently stressed
and declining fisheries of West Africa. In each case I discuss the social and
economic consequences of this environmental problem and the idea that each of
these fisheries is as much about people as much as it is about fish. In my
concluding chapter, I discuss the parallels between these two cases (especially in
the processes involved) and the important differences (specifically the very
different social impacts). Finally I address the policy implications of my analysis.
The introduction offers a brief history of fisheries, with a focus on fish as
an important resource historically, starting with an example from Kurlansky’s
“Cod” to show just how crucial fishing was to US history. From there I discuss
how fisheries are unique as a resource, and how those characteristics affect their
use, management, ownership, depletion, and conservation. Fish are living
organisms with complex biology and behaviors, and are part of a larger, still little
understood, ecosystem. Therefore, a fishery encompasses not only the fish
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themselves, but also their environment and all the factors, including humans,
which influence their populations, and with which their fate is intertwined. This
makes “fisheries resources” an inherently different resource than, say, coal. The
introduction concludes with a discussion of the depletion of fisheries that has been
going on for decades and that is currently intensifying on a global level. I make
the case for why this matters, first generally, then within the specifics of
environmental justice, the social element of fisheries.
The second chapter lays out the general information and framework that
are necessary to make the case studies meaningful. I begin by problematizing and
dissecting the concept of overfishing, breaking it into its political and economic,
and physical and technological components, and arguing that the simple
explanations of overfishing offered in discussions of fisheries depletion are
insufficient. The purpose is to show how ideas, management, and governance
have converged to create collapses worldwide, especially in the First World, and
how the same processes are occurring on a shorter timescale in the Third World.
This sets up the environmental justice framework that supports the analysis of the
Northwest Atlantic and West Africa. In this chapter I incorporate general
discussions of power relations in management and governance, and how that
ensures that certain groups have little say in decision making, and suffer the
harshest consequences when a fishery becomes depleted.
The depletion and collapse of the Northwest Atlantic cod fishery is
extremely, perhaps excessively, well documented in many academic disciplines,
with particular attention to the New England states in the United States and
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Newfoundland in Canada. I discuss the specifics of this fishery and its importance
to the region, then examine the processes that lead to its dramatic (and seemingly
sudden) collapse in the early 1990s. In discussing the run-up to collapse I focus
on power dynamics and who made decisions, and about the differences within the
fishery (on-shore vs. off-shore, etc.) and who benefited and suffered from what
policies and impacts. I also discuss what has happened since the collapse,
focusing most on the “little guy”, the fishermen who were left without a
livelihood or who are watching it disappear. This discussion of what happens to
fishermen and fishing communities sets up a comparison to the situation in West
Africa. The processes may be similar, but the human effects are different. New
Englanders and Newfoundlanders who were reliant on the fishery have certainly
suffered, but they weren’t and aren’t in danger of starvation. Even in today’s
neoliberal political environment, the governments, especially Canada’s, have tried
to help. There is no such support structure in place if and when West Africa’s
fishery fails.
The fourth chapter follows a similar structure to the third, to make an
appropriate comparison. I discuss the importance of West African fisheries to
coastal communities as a valuable source of employment, and nutrition for
millions of Africans citizens. I look at the power relations within these nations
and between these nations and the EU, with a focus on how these unequal power
relations create a situation where those with the greatest stake in the future of
these fisheries have little or no say in the governance of this resource. I then
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reemphasize the important environmental justice implications of this situation,
and the social and economic impact of a fishery collapse on West Africa.
The final chapter is where the differences between the case studies are
discussed, as well as the environmental justice implications of fisheries depletion
more generally. I address what lessons can be drawn from this analysis, including
the need for greater consumer awareness of the social and environmental
implications of their seafood, and serious consideration of environmental justice
and social issues in local, national and international fisheries governance.
My thesis is based largely on literature review, mostly drawing on
geographic literature, but I also draw from other academic disciplines, as well as
government and non-profit sources, and occasionally the mainstream media.
As fisheries decline worldwide, the effects are unevenly distributed. For
many residents of the First World, it simply means higher prices for seafood, and
perhaps a shift in what is available in grocery stores. However, for those who are
economically marginalized, in the First and Third Worlds, whose livelihoods, and
sometimes lives, depend on declining or collapsed fisheries, the over-exploitation
of the world’s once abundant fisheries is devastating. Too often this important,
but little discussed, social and environmental problem is dismissed as simply “too
many fishermen catching too many fish for too long.” However as my project
shows, fisheries governance, and depletion, is highly political, with social,
economic, and technical components. The decline of marine fisheries is not only
an environmental disaster; it is a social one as well, making this an important
issue of environmental justice.
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